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ABSTRACT
Seeking to improve the role of Information Technology
(IT) and business practices in the Department of Defense,
organizations were sought to serve as a model to aid in the
improvement process. Southwest Airlines, a major U.S.
carrier based in Dallas, Texas was chosen because of its
record of profitabilitu and its unique use of information
technology. This case study describes Southwest's mission,
goals, organization, business decisions, attitude, growth
and information technology. The primary focus is the fact
that Southwest does not participate in a major carrier's
reservation system.
Lessons learned for a military officer in terms of
Information Technology are to avoid redundancy, improve
functionality, avoid expensive enhancements that do not
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Seeking to improve the role of Information Technology
(IT) and business practices In the Department of Defense,
organizations were sought to serve as a model to aid in the
improvement process. Southwest Airlines based In Dallas,
Texas was chosen because of its record of profitability and
its unique use of information technology.
This thesis chronicles the role of information
technology in the growth of Southwest Airlines (SWA). It
includes the business decisions and strategy used in the
development of the organization. SWA is a model of a well
run organization. It can serve as an example to military
members In the areas of cost consciousness, running a lean
and efficient organization, and taking care of its
customers. The information is presented in a case study
format that covers a period of 22 years and is analyzed in
light of the rapid evolution and spread of information
systems technology.
B. METHODOLOGY
A case study is a description of a real situation that
occurred in a real organization (Cohen, 1980, p. 108). A
case study evolves from one or more key issues or problems
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in a given situation. This case will concentrate on IT
issues faced bU the executives and management at Southwest
Airlines. It will focus on the decisions made during
procurement of information technology and how the culture of
the organization influenced those decisions.
A case studU is an effective method for presenting
valuable insight into the constant technological change and
innovation characteristics of the computer systems
management field and their effects on management and
organization change (Benbasat, 1987, p. 370).
This thesis is written as a teaching tool bU re-creating
the organization's environment, and portraying its
characters so as to present a situation where students
discern the problems and recommend solutions. The
information is presented in chronological sequence using a
narrative and dialogue format. This format is designed to
facilitate the probe for questions and answers, problems and
solutions. The dialogue will allow a reader to learn about
the personal characteristics of those people making
decisions. Personal characteristics are often keU to
understanding how and whU certain decisions are made.
Information regarding this case comes from written
documentation, interviews, and observing practices within
the organization. Presenting the information in
chronological sequence provides a logical discussion of the
decisions and events surrounding the management of Southwest
2
Airlines. This method encompasses the depth necessary for
the details and processes within a situation to be
completely understood.
C. BACKGROUND
Southwest achieved major airline status in 1989 and was
ranked as the seventh largest airline in the United States
in 1993. An airline becomes a major when it exceeds one
billion dollars in annual revenue.
In the first half of 1993, it was the number one U.S.
major airline in terms of profitability and service. Service
is measured by the number of customer complaints, on time
performance of flights, and baggage loss. (Alderman, 1592,
p. 126)
Southwest Airlines is unique in that it does not share a
major airline's Computer Reservation System (CRS). A CRS is
considered to be an essential marketing tool in the
airline world. (Sutton, 1989, p. 418)
D. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES
"In an increasingly constrained budget environment when
all aspects of federal spending are properly coming under
greater scrutiny, improved management of costly automated
information systems represents a substantial opportunity for
significant defense cost savings" . (Conyers, 1989, p. 1)
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The amount of moneu that is spent bU the Department of
Defense (DoD) in the area of Information Sustems is of grave
concern (Table 1.1).
TABLE 1.1 IT BUDGET (DoD)





In the author's opinion, a portion of this budget is
wasted bu poor planning on procurement of Automatic Data
Processing (ADP) equipment, inadequate management of
Information Resources (IR), the development of redundant
sustems, and agenries being seduced into buying expensive
luxuru options or "bells and whistles" from contractors.
Responsibility for these actions must lie with the
leadership of the various millitaru organizations and they
should be held accountable for all decisions.
It appears to the author that DoD agencies are sometimes
encouraged to procure unnecessaru sustems just because
another agency might have the latest technology. It seems
as though the two fundamental questions for a sound business
decision:
Lj
1. Do we need this?
2. Does it make sense to buy it?
(Interview, Dennison, 1993)
sometimes evade the Department of Defense when it comes to
procurement of ADP equipment.
Upon graduation, the officers at the Naval Postgraduate
School will be returning to their respective commands to
fulfill their pawback tour, assuming Jobs which may entail
working with contractors and making decisions for new
Information Swstems (IS). Maintaining the attitude of
"having the latest toy" can only perpetuate the needless
spending which has permeated the DoD and still continues
todaw.
The Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative
was established in October 198 by the Department of Defense
to improve the standardization, quality and consistencU of
data from DoD's multiple management information systems. It
was designed to also implement new or improved business
methods. (Hutto, Feb. '91, p. 1)
From the author's experience, military personnel are
used to dealing with multi-million dollar, high technology
equipment, e.g. tactical Jet aircraft, M-1 tanks, aircraft
carriers, etc. Their primary concern is the operation and
not the financial management of this equipment. Members who
later in their careers become involved in the
5
procurement/development process tend to carrW this same
financial unaccountabilitu attitude toward cost into their
naw positions. The issue of attitude must be addressed in
order to curtail the current needless spending.
This thesis will trace the history of Southwest
Airlines. Through it's past, we will see a simple,
uncomplicated philosophU which was used to make business
decisions and the role IT plaUed within the conpanU.
Perhaps this simple, Uet highly successful attitude could
prove to be exactlU what is needed in todaI's changing
environment, specificallU in the Defense Information Systems




This chapter defines case methodology. Other research
methods will be compared to the case study, drawing
contrasts and parallels between them. The benefits of a
case study in terms of research and teaching will also be
discussed. (Gonzalez, 1991)
B. CASE STUDY FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES
A case study stands on its own as a research strategy as
evidenced in the following definition:
A case study is an empirical inquiry that:
- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its
real life context; when
- the boundaries between phenomenon and context are
not clearly evident; and
- multiple sources of evidence are used. (Yin, 1976,
p. 23)
Prior to this definition, a common misconception held by
those uneducated in case methodology was that research
strategies were of a hierarchical nature (Yin, 1976, p. 15).
Historically, case studies were considered to be at the
bottom of the research hierarchy. Case studies were often
used as the preliminary part of other types of
research. (Gonzalez, 1551)
Presently, however, views on conducting research have
evolved to the point that each type of research strategy is
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seen as "a different way of collecting and analyzing
empirical evidence." (Yin, 1976, p. 15) The research
strategy selected is based on the subject matter and
research objectives. Research serves one of three purposes:
exploration, description, or explanation. Each research
strategy can be used for each of the research purposes. The
strategy selected depends on the following conditions: (1)
type of research question; (2) extent of control over
behavioral events; (3) focus on contemporary or historical
events (Yin, 1976, p. 16)
There are five research strategies recognized within the
social sciences: experiment, survey, archival analysis,
history, and case study. Case study, history and
experiments are the only research strategies that will be
addressed. They are used to answer the "how" or "why"
research question. A case study focuses on contemporary
phenomena where there is no control by the researcher over
the behavior of the persons involved in the case. History's
focus is on past phenomena with no requirement to control
behavioral events. The case study method has the advantage
of adding direct observations and interviews when compared
to history. This advantage is due primarily to the
difference in research focus, present versus past.
Experiments, on the other hand, focus on contemporary
phenomena and require control over behavior. Traditionally,
researchers have emphasized quantitative and controlled
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events in an effort to generalize the results, as well as,
replicate the event. Today, these researchers recognize the
benefits obtained from case research as being more than an
analysis of decisions or events. (Yin, 1976, p. 15)
C. ADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
Case studies provide a description of "holistic and
meaningful characteristics of such real life events as life
cycles, organization and managerial processes, neighborhood
change, international relations, and maturation of
industries." (Yin, 1975, p. 14) Case study research has a
unique strength in its ability to assemble multiple sources
of information and present this evidence as a whole,
complete picture. It captures a complete understanding of
the entire situation, including cause and effect
relationships. "As a research endeavor, the case study
contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual,
organizational, social, and political phenomena." (Yin,
1976, p. 14)
Qualitative data in the form of words give the case
study method another advantage. Qualitative data are a
"source of well-grounded, rich descriptions, and
explanations of processes occurring in local contexts."
(Miles, 1938, p. 15) Personal feelings and opinions,
documented through interview and observation, are a
vital source of information in understanding decisions
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made in any given situation. Attitudes, relationships
among personnel, and the power and influence within the
organization are portrayed with words. "Words,
organized into incidents/stories provide a concrete,
vivid, meaningful flavor that often proves far more
convincing to a reader.. .than a page of numbers."
(Miles, 198*, p. 15)
0. DISADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
The qualitative advantage found in case study research
is also contributing to the difficulty in accepting the case
study method as a key research strategy. Words, often
having a variety of meanings, are subject to interpretation
and could therefore bias a researcher's view of the
situation. Also, "observations tend to be unique and
nonreplicable." (Lee, 1986, p. 2) This suggests that
another researcher would not be able to replicate the entire
case study from gathering and analyzing the information.
(Gonzalez, 1991)
Case study research does not conform to a standard and
accepted method of data analysis. This lack of common
language contributes to the uncertainty of case study. Case
study researchers in the past have been found to influence
the case study results. (Lee, 1986, p. 2)
Several other drawbacks to the case stLdy method are
also apparent. Case study preopration is time-consuming and
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their documentation is voluminous. One who favors the
quantitative viewpoint may be skeptical of case study
research because there is the tendency to draw
generalizations from the conclusions and apply them to other
situations. This, however, is not the intent of case study
conclusions. "Case study conclusions are generalizable to
theoretical propositions and not to populations or
universes...In this sense a case study does not represent a
'sample' and the investigators' goal is to expand and
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to
enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)." (Yin,
1976, p. 21)
The case study method has proven to be invaluable to the
information systems arena. "The information systems area is
characterized by constant technological change and
innovation" (Benbasat, 1987, p. 370). This technological
change and innovation has had an impact on management and
organizational issues in information systems departments.
Case study research has been able to provide valuable
insights into these issues (Benbasat, 1987, p. 370).
E. CASE STUDY FOR TEACHING PURPOSES
In any learning situation there are two factors: the
specific knowledge to be learned and the process of
learning. The learning process is a method used by the
individual to solve a problem or make a decision. A
11
student's knowledge and ability to deal with the reality of
life outside the classroom is dependent on both of these
criteria. (Pascale, 1973, p. 1)
Case studies present real life situations. Case studies
provide a wide range of experiences for the student to
compare and contrast. A student may one day find himself or
herself in a similar situation and would be able to draw
from these case study experiences. "Case studies are
valuable lessons in teaching students the habits of
diagnosing problems, analyzing, and evaluating alternatives
and formulating workable plans of action." (Harvey, 1988,
p. 56) Studerts must also learn that decisions are not made
purely from an analysis of the facts. "The decision is a
political process...involving power and influence." (Lee,
198B6, p. 2)
Using case studies in a safe classroom environment
allows a student an opportunity to apply the theory he or
she has learned to a given situation. There is also the
challenge of validating a theory in a contemporary setting.
If a theory does not hold there is an opportunity to explore
the reasons why. Students may debate the issues of cause
and effect, problem and solution. These debates will force
them to examine their assumptions and defend their positions
on the issues. Other benefits of the use of a case study in
a classroom include teaching students the following skills:
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how to search for facts, choose between alternatives, and
what questions it is essential to ask. (Pascale, 1973, p. 2)
Retired Navy Admiral Stansfield Turner believes strongly
in using case studies within military classrooms. He says,
"Many of the education programs, are simply cramming
officers' heads with facts rather than helping them to
develop the skills to deal with difficult problems oF
leadership, strategy, and management.. .the case study method
will help prepare students For the time when they rise to
the level where they really have to make decisions For our
country." (Rosenau, 1988, p. 1)
F. METHODOLOGY OF THESIS CASE STUDY
The case study that is the subject oF this thesis
chronicles the management oF an organization during a
twenty-three year period. It describes the leadership,
planning, business philosophies, and technical issues as
they relate to information resource management. A case
study treats people as the observable agents through which
the unobservable Forces oF the organization act (Lee, 1986,
p. 9).
Sources oF information included written documentation,
interview, and direct observation. Written documentation
included articles written on the organization. All
interviews but Four were conducted in person. The Four
exceptions were conducted via telephone. Interviews were
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conducted with personnel related to information technologu
within the organization. The case setting is considered a
contemporarU situation because computer sUstems management
is a relativelW new field. (Gonzalez, 1991)
1it
III. BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Edmund Burke said, 'We walk in the footsteps of our
forefathers,' and I EHerb Kelleher] think if we remember
where we have been, it's sometimes helpful to instruct us
as to where we are. (Kelleher, 1988, p. 16)
The storU of Southwest Airlines began in 1967 with
Rollin W. King, a San Antonio investment counselor, and Herb
Kelleher, a New Jersey born San Antonio real estate lawyer.
Air transportation between Dallas and Houston was verW poor.
It was serviced bW long haul carriers and the Fares were too
high. As a result, the market had not developed and current
airlines could not compete with an automobile. (Hallock,
1977, p. 160)
The mission of these two gentlemen was to create a
scheduled commuter airline, based in Dallas, Texas,
targeting the Dallas, Houston and San Antonio commute for
business persons. The concept was two fold.
The first goal was to create a short haul carrier to
compete with automobiles. Bigger airlines shunned the less
profitable, short haul flights. Southwest aimed to
specialize in this market, utilizing a point to point system
rather than a hub-and-spoke system. The second element was
15
to be a low fare carrier with veru high frequency, because
frequencU equaled convenience to customers. (Kelleher,
1988, p. 17)
A simple fare structure was used, geared basically to
attracting business and other customers with low fares at
peak times, and even lower fares to fill seats at off-peak
times. It was to be a scrappy, low cost commuter airline
designed to fill a regional void left by expansion-happy
Braniff (Bayer, 1985, p. 4). Adopting a no-frills approach,
meal service or assigned seating would not be offered on any
flight. (Sutton, 1989, p. 418)
King's lawyers received permission from the Texas
Aeronautics Commission CTAC) to initiate operations. A
critical point, being an intrastate airline it could set
it's own fares without approval from the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB). Airline regulation dictated by the CAB was in
effect at this time, however Texas depicted a microcosm of
deregulation. (Joyce, 1972, p. 20)
Braniff, an already established airline holding BO% of
the commuter market would be the chief competitor for
Southwest. Trans Texas and Continental accounted for the
other 20% of the market. These three airlines viewed
Southwest as an unnecessary intrusion, and lead a legal
battle against them for three years, all the way up to the
Supreme Court. They claimed that the Texas market couldn't
possibly support another carrier. (Joyce, 1972, p. 20)
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Rollin King raised the money and Herb Kelleher spent it
as quickly arguing Southwest's case in the appellate courts.
The case ended in a favorable decision for Southwest to
begin operations out of Love field in Dallas. Trans Texas
and Braniff were convicted of antitrust violations; however,
the antitrust grand Jury was subsequently dismissed with no
action against Trans Texas or Braniff (SWA History, 1993).
(Henderson, 1982, p. 42); (Loeffeholz, 1989, p. 26)
With S1*3 in the bank, no planes, no crews, Southwest
began as an airline at the start of 1971. M. Lamar Muse, a
Texas financial man who had recently Joined the company,
became president. King became the executive vice president
and head of operations. Herbert Kelleher was the general
counsel and director, and was named chairman of the board in
1978. To obtain investment capital, Muse obtained
clearance from the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) to go
public. 650,000 shares of SWA stock was issued at 511 per
share (SWA History, 1993). Southwest could now purchase
aircraft with this capital. (Joyce, 1972, p. 20)
The Boeing Aircraft Company had overproduced Boeing
737s on speculation and were having a "clearance sale".
King flew up to the Seattle based company and bought four
737s 5600 thousand less per aircraft than the going price.
Painting the aircraft's exterior red, orange and Texas gold
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seemed to accentuate the hurried mood the airline would
elicit (Shifrin, JulW, 1985, p. 45). (JoWce, 1972, p. 21)
Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) was their guiding
light and would be the model to investors that a similar
operation in Texas could work. PSA had started a commuter
airline between Los Angeles and San Francisco ten Wears
earlier at reduced fares and proved to be successful.
(Joyce, 1972, p. 20)
Braniff was using Boeing 727s with three engines and a
three man crew, compared to two engines and a two man crew
on the Boeing 737s used by Southwest. This was the first
advantage Southwest would gain, with operating expenses
about 33% less than Braniff. Another advantage was that
many of Braniff's pilots had tenure and were paid a high
salary; the pilots of the brand new Southwest Airline
started at a lower pay level. Also, Southwest's flights
originated in Dallas and many of Braniff's flights
originated their flights out of state. This resulted in 99%
of Southwest's flights arriving within five minutes of
schedule, a definite plus to the group that both airlines
were targeting - businesspeople. (Joyce, 1972, p. 21)
Dick Elliot, formerly with Braniff, was brought in to
head marketing. Both he and King selected the Bloom Agency
in Dallas to lead a good natured "sex exploitation"
advertising campaign for Southwest. (Appendices B & C)
Recruiting the Southwest hostesses, they looked for warm,
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personable and great-looking girls in hot pants (Joyce,
1972, p. 23). The 40 out of 1200 girls selected were then
trained by a woman who had trained the Bunny hostesses on
Hugh Heffner's Playboy plane. "Love" became the catchword
for Southwest (remember that they were also operating out of
Love Field in Dallas) and adopted LUV as their New York
Stock Exchange symbol (Erickson, 198q, p. 22).
Wearing tangerine hot pants, clinging orange sweaters
and white go-go boots, the hostesses would greet the
passengers by saying "Welcome to the love flight, I hope
this will be a love affair to remember". At Southwest, the
customers fought not for the window seats, but for the aisle
seats (Texas Gets Bigger, 1979, p. 93). However, Elliot
maintained that it was not sexy they were after, it's youth,
and it was this youthful vigor that caught the fancy of the
passengers.
June 14, 1971, advertising for Southwest flooded the
market with the following comparisons:
19
TABLE 1 1971 COMPARISONS OF AIRFARES
In flight
Airline Fares' liquor prices
Braniff S27 S1.50





If any passengers complained on Southwest, they would
get a free drink (love potion) or if a passenger showed up
five minutes prior to a flight that was full, he or she was
first to board on the next flight, flew for free, and got
unlimited free drinks.
The three routes that Southwest started with were:
a. Love Field, Dallas - Hobby Field, Houston
b. Hobby Field, Houston - San Antonio
c. San Antonio - Love Field, Dallas
Southwest's first flight was June 18, 1971 carrying ten
passengers from Dallas to San Antonio. (Castelli, 1550, p.
40)
B. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
In 1964 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) declared that
all interstate carriers would operate from a single
Dallas/Ft. Worth airport. All airlines signed an agreement
in 1958 with the two cities that they would operate from the
20
new airport when completed, but Southwest was not partW to
that agreement. Southwest also received their Commuter
Airline's Certification from the Texas Aeronautics
Commission, not the Civil Aeronautics Board and didn't come
under their regulations. (Dallas/Ft. Worth Sue, 1972, p.
30)
Trouble loomed on the horizon for the new airline. In
"June 1972, the cities of Dallas and Ft. Worth filed suit
against Southwest, truing to force the airline to operate at
the new Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport CD/FW), 19 miles from
downtown Dallas, rather than Love Field which was onlU seven
miles from downtown. Southwest knew the extra 12 miles
would make the rush hour drive longer than the 50 minute
flight from Houston. The concern for D/FW was that other
airlines would seek permission to move back to Love field,
reducing the intended revenue to pau off construction of the
new airport. Winning the suit would give Southwest an
obvious advantage over their competitors. (Dallas/Ft. Worth
Sue, 1972, p. 30)
The U.S. Supreme Court found in favor of Southwest.
Galled bU the decision, citu backers influenced Texas
Congressman and Speaker of the House Jim Wright to stick a
rider (Wright Amendment) on a trade bill that banned
interstate flights between Love Field and anything but the
states contiguous to Texas - New Mexico, Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Oklahoma. (Loeffelholz, 19BS, p. 27)
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But no one predicted that the Love-Hobby route would
turn out to be one of the biggest monopoly markets, with
well over one million passengers per year (Field, 1988, p.
36). Southwest was the only airline to operate from Love
Field. Francisco Lorenzo, President of Texas International,
threatened to move flights back to Love Field. Unaaunted,
M. Lamar Muse continued with plans to develop the Southwest
passenger terminal at Love Field. (Southwest Wins Fight,
1573, p. 36)
C. PRODUCTIVITY ATTITUDE
After operating for one year, Southwest captured 40% of
the Dallas-Houston market, however, were still showing a
loss of about $1.5 million for the year. (Southwest Lowers,
1973, p. 26)
A loss factor for SWA was the required dead-head trips.
Each night the aircraft returned to home base in Dallas for
both operation and maintenance reasons, with a poor showing
in traffic volume. Southwest, looking at a $9.95 one way
bus fare from Houston to Dallas decided to charge only ten
dollars for the last flight home and discovered a new market
of kids, housewives and hippies. They typically sold 100
seats on that flight, making money on anything over SO sold
seats. The market was already there, Southwest simply
converted them to a new mode of transportation. This was
also the beginning of Southwest's two-tiered pricing
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structure, the Executive Class if traveling before 7 P.M.
and the Pleasure Class for after 7 P.M. (Southwest's Ten,
1572, p. 33)
In the first quarter of 1973, Southwest lost 5176,000
(Commuter, 1973, p. 30); Wet, initiated the industrU's first
employee profit sharing plan (Southwest Cites,1376, p. 41).
SWA initiated the plan not in exchange for union concessions
but because they wanted employee involvement (Sutton, 1989,
p. 416). Theu believed that Job satisfaction and a sense of
participation would contribute to a dynamic organization
(BaUer, June 1981, p. k).
In the second quarter of 1973 Southwest turned its'
first profitable quarter, netting $183,000. Immediately
management sought route expansion to Harligen and Corpus
Christi, Texas, and purchased another Boeing 737 (Commuter
Airline, 1973, p. 30).
By 1976, Southwest had successive profit quarters since
the second quarter of 1973. Its earnings were $2.1 million
in 1974 and S3.1 million in 1975 on revenues of $22.8
million (Flying Cheap, 1.976, p. 5). Southwest was providing
the same service as othr: airlines, but 42% cheaper than
anybody else (Southwest Airline Pushing, 1976, p. 32). SWA
owed its success to a "productivity" attitude among the
employees. The following are some examples of this
productivity attitude:
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1. Contracts. Pilots signed a new contract in 1979 and
insisted on keeping everWthing based on production, not on
credit hours. Normally in the industry, a pilot received
credit hours whether or not he flew a flight. At Southwest,
a pilot was paid only if he actually flew. (Baumgarner,
1979, p. 80).
2. Aircraft Usage. The industrW operated an average
plane approximatelU eight hours per day whereas Southwest
used its' planes 11 hours each daW (Nulty, 1981, p. 46).
3. Terminal Gate Usage. Every airline uses terminal
gates to load and unload their passengers. The average
number of flights at each terminal gate in the industry was
4.5 flights per day. The average number of Southwest flights
per day at each gate was 10.5 flights (Welles,1992, p. 47).
Southwest operated a high-Flying mass-transit system. Its
passengers knew that if they missed one "bus", the next one
would be along shortly (Henderson, July 1991, p. 36).
4. Turnaround Times. Southwest was enjoying a better
than anticipated turn around time of ten minutes on the
Boeing 737s, claiming 95% on time performance in its
schedules (Southwest's Ten, 1972, p. 33). But the ten
minute turnaround time was actually born out of necessity
rather than good planning. Shortly after starting the
airline and four years of lawsuits, Southwest was nearly
broke. They sold one of their four aircraft in May 1972 to
Frontier for 5500,000 profit to raise some working capital
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(SWA History, 1S93, p. 2). They had to fly a four plane
schedule on three airplanes, and the only way to do that was
by implementing a ten minute turnaround time. (Henderson,
1982, p. 37)
This quick turnaround time was extremely important
to Southwest and became the focus of their advertising. The
productivity attitude of all employees cooperating together
from ticket agents to baggage handlers was required to
achieve the ten minute turnaround goal. There were many
simple, yet effective cost saving factors which contributed
to this goal:
a. Manifesting Passengers. In the early years, a
ticket agent used cash registers located at each gate to
issue a ticket to a passenger. The airline ticket was the
receipt itself. By controlling a foot operated on/off
switch the agent simultaneously spoke into a mike recording
the passenger information. This provided the required
flight manifest. (Southwest Cites, 1976, p. 40)
Initially customers were mistaking these cash
register tickets as receipts and discarding them. Southwest
executives proposed to do what every other carrier had done
and purchase a multi-million dollar system to issue standard
airline tickets. While at a meeting discussing one of these
machines, an individual suggested that the current cash
register ticket be modified and have printed on them in big
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capital letters, "THIS IS A TICKET". That's what Southwest
did. They considered all options, rather than conforming to
an industry norm (Henderson, 1991, p. 36). Cash register
ticketing was so important that in 197B Southwest refused to
raise fare prices to cover fuel costs increases, because
they would have run out of keys on their cash registers and
would then be required to buy new machines (Southwest
Airline Seeking, 1978, p. 36).
b. Modifying Aircraft Interior. Southwest found
that the first passengers to board an aircraft held up the
boarding line, messing with the closets then grabbing the
nearest seat. When the plane landed, the departing
passengers were held up by the same people rooting through
the closets. This delay infringed on the ten minute
turnaround time. A simple fix for Southwest: they removed
closets from the airplanes. (Taylor, 1982, p. 108)
c. Point-to-Point System. Southwest used a point-
to-point system rather than the hub system which grew c'it of
deregulation as a way to maximize aircraft usage. Hubs
complicated matters for a short haul carrier. The point-to-
point system maintained an evenly spaced flow of aircraft
all day long (Brown, 1990, p. 82).
d. Connecting Traffic. Another factor contributing
to quick turnaround times was the lack of connecting traffic
in Texas. Most passengers traveled Just one stop. Since
the flights were less than two hours there was no need to
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provide meal service, and the ground time of loading meals
was eliminated. (Southwest Cites, 1976, p. 40)
e. Conflicting Traffic. The lack of conflicting
air traffic at both Love Field and Hobby contributed to
quick turnaround times.
f. Assignud Seating. Southwest had reserved
seating on their flights, but no assigned seating. This
quickened the process of embarking passengers. It also
would have required more gates and an increase cost in data-
processing equipment and staffing. SWA would lose their
competitive edge with the resulting increases in fares.
(Henderson,1991, p. 33)
Colleen Barrett, Southwest's Executive V.P. for
Customers, stated, "Southwest didn't make any bones about
what they were, but they delivered what they promised."
(Onesal, 1991, p. 117)
g. Team Work. Flight attendants didn't wait for
the ground crews to refasten seat belts and pick up
discarded newspapers at the completion of a flight. They
would start these tasks as the customers debarked the
aircraft. Also, supervisors helped baggage handlers on the
ramp if an extra hand was required. (Southwest Cites, 1976,
p. 40)
h. Boarding Passes. Southwest used large, colored,
sequentially numbered, reusable boarding passes. An actual
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number of passengers were readily available and the brightly
colored passes wouldn't be carried off accidentally.
(Southwest Cites, 1976, p. 40)
I. Aircraft Boarding. Because of the non-assigned
seating, passengers first on a boarding line had priority
seating. Prior to a plane pulling up to a terminal gate,
people were "milling" around the doors, ready to quickly
board the aircraft. Some referred to this process aq
"cattle-car boarding" but Southwest liked to think of it as
boarding "family style" (Henderson, 1982, p. 37). This
boarding method made Southwest's quick turns at the gate
possible. The planes made money in the air, not on the
ground, so if the planes were flying more than sitting,
lower fares could be charged. (Bayer, 1981, p. 84)
Team work and enthusiasm on the part of Southwest
employees was key to the operations. Moving to a more
leisurely 20 minute turnaround time would require two more
aircraft to fly the same number of flights, which would have
incurred higher costs (Bayer, 1981, p. 84). (Southwest
Cites, 1976, p. 40)
An economist studying Southwest owed its' profitability
to the two-tier price structure in which there was an
Executive Class fare for those traveling during the week
prior to 7 P.M.. Business people were targeted for this
service. The second tier was the Pleasure Class for those
traveling after 7 P.M. on week days and weekend flights
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(non-peak hours). GenerallU 65% of the passenger revenues
were derived from the Executive Class (peak hours) and
Pleasure Class accounted for 35% of the revenues. Using a
two-tier fare system rather than the single-tier low fare
sustem of Pacific Southwest increased aircraft utilization
and spread out fixed costs over a wider base of flights.
(Troxell, 1977, p. 35); (Sutton, 19B9, p. 41B)
D. MUSE ERA ENDS
Southwest's 1976 stock prices more than tripled since
the airline first started turning a profit in 1973. Muse
set his sights on running a low cost commuter out of
Chicago's nearly deserted Midway Airport, using the same
two-tiered fare system and the "low fares and full planes"
philosophy. The cities he aimed to serve were within 200-
500 miles, so he could maintain the same economical, two
engine Boeing 737s in his inventory. (Flying Cheap, 1976,
p. *5)
High startup costs were associated with these new
routes, however Southwest usually managed to keep the unit
cost at a minimum by quickly expanding its revenue and
traffic base. Susan Loeffelholz of Financial World noted,
"They simply breed traffic wherever they went."
(Loeffelholz, 1989, p. 27) Air travel tended to double in
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any city within 12 months after Southwest began service with
more frequent flights and low fares. (Troxell, 1985,
p. 31t)
Muse said, " They [the competitors] want to make money
by raising fares and we make the highest profit margin in
the airline industry by cutting fares." (Flying Cheap,
1976, p. 46) Daniel Kaplan, director of the office of
economic analysis for the Civil Aeronautics Board notes,
"The profit that Southwest experienced by offering much
lower fares than competitors indicated price elasticity in
the airline industry." (Taub, 1983, p. 19) Travel agents
generally didn't like to handle Southwest because of their
low fares. Agents normally made approximately a ten percent
commission on each ticket sold. Their concern was the
dollar volume. There was a natural bias for travel agents
to put people on airplanes whose ticket prices were higher
than those of Southwest's prices. (Baumgarner, 1979, p. 82)
In 1975 and 1976 Southwest made gains in both revenue
and profits without a fare increase. Muse said, "I wanted
to prove to those dumb bastards running those other airlines
that the way to make money is by lowering the fares, not
raising them." (Bailey, 1978, p. 29)
Muse gloated over his success in the Texas market and
wanted to prove that Southwest's strategy could work
anywhere. He raised Southwest's debt limit from $60 million
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to $125 million and planned to issue 750,000 shares at
520/share to the public to help finance the Mlidway project.
Southwest directors were concerned with the complications of
managing two separate organizations, one in Dallas and the
other in Chicago. The purchase of aircraft, hiring
additional personnel, and the duplication of operational and
maintenance support were all added costs which Southwest was
unwilling to make at this time. Southwest directors were
skeptical and Muse grew impatient. (Bailey, 1978, pp. 29-30)
On March 2k, 1978, Muse sent a letter to the members of
the board demanding that they either drop a director (Rollin
King) that was hesitating on the Midway decision, or accept
his resignation. A few day later, 4 5 seconds into a routine
board meeting, they accepted Muse's resignation. Howard C.
Putnam was named as the new CEO. CBailey, 1978, p. 29)
Disregarding the notion of operating out of Midway,
Southwest received permission from the CAB on a new Houston-
New Orleans (Moisant Field) route. Now that Southwest was
interstate, it fell under the Ju:isdiction of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (Baumgarner, 1979, p. 82). Within six
months it was operating at a 81.38% load factor, due to its




In 1977, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) eliminated
government control of airline fares, commencing airline
deregulation. In 1976, the Airline Deregulation Act was
passed, which eliminated the 30 to 60 day approval process
required for adding or dropping routes. These two events
allowed airlines a greater utilization of their resources
instead of having the government dictating what routes to
fly and fares to charge. (Yovovich, 1981, p. S2)
With deregulation, fares were brought more in line with
actual costs. Pricing flexibility was the advantage that
the airlines gained from the lack of CAB regulation. Major
airlines could better control traffic from the point of
origin to the point of destination by using the hub-and-
spoke model more efficiently. CYovovich, 1981, pp. S2-S6)
For the first time in 40 years, airline deregulation turned
a protected market into a competitive scramble. Airlines
discovered what passenger preferences were and how the
consumer made their choices. They experimented with cut
rate and special fares for frequent travelers and interest
groups. (Nulty, 1981, p. 45)
Unfortunately, during the next decade of deregulation,
service would take a middle seat to growth, mergers, and
competition for many airlines (O'Neal, 1991, p. 116). Twenty
new carriers started since deregulation, but by 198' twelve
airlines had filed for bankruptcy protection. The problem
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was that now lines were under-capitalized. TheW relied on
bookings for cash Flow and when the market soFtened, they
had no cash reserves to Fall back on. The Free market leFt
little room For marginal operators. (Dubin, 1984, p. 75)
"Southwest's need to outgrow Texas coincided with the
Civil Aeronautics Board's deregulation policy to make the
Market vision possible." (Texas Gets Bigger, 1979, p. 88)
In comparison, PSA had developed the market in CaliFornia,
but stagnated while waiting For deregulation in order to
enter now markets - one oF the contriLuting factors to their
decline (Henderson,1982, p. 43). Southwest Airline would be
a prime example oF the advantages oF deregulation in the
industry (Bulban, 1979, p. 38).
Over the Wears oF regulation, the larger airlines had
built up a considerable debt incurred From labor agreements,
large jets, expensive service such as hot meals, and
luxurious terminals intended to attract upscale passengers
(Nulty, 1981, p. 46). This was evident by newcomers such as
New York Air, People Express, and a low-Fare line such as
Southwest Airlines able to operate about 40% less than the
major airlines. Overall, airline industry employment




With Southwest's KISS philosophy (Keep It Simple
Stupid), they limited their fleet to the fuel efficient, low
maintenance Boeing 737s. The benefits were crew inter-
changeability, reduced training, reduced ground equipment
requirements, and simplified maintenance. (Henderson, 1982,
p. 36)
In 197B the market in Texas continued to be explosive.
The new CEO Putnam, a former V.P. for marketing at United
Airlines (UA), incorporated some of the planning systems
from United. He laid out a blue print for the markets
Southwest would expand to in the next two to three years.
(Baumgarner, 1979, p. 80)
He had some ambitious plans, but changed his mind on a
lot of things. Putnam said, "Too much sophistication too
soon would stifle the creativity around here, and would cost
more than we can afford. We keep the process simple by not
being too big. Why mess with a winning formula?"
(Baumgarner, 1979, p. 80)
Putnam confidently boasted about Southwest achieving an
annual growth rate in the neighborhood of 40%. The
Boeing 737s were reconfigured with Slimline seating, to
increase the capacity from 112 to 118 seats.
(Baumgarner, 1979, p. 80)
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Putnam did not see growth from other compating airlines,
but instead from automobiles and busses (Baumgarner, 1979,
p. 81). For example, Braniff was charging $62 one way
Dallas to San Antonio, where Southwest only charged S15.
Southwest could have easily raised their price to S30 or S0
and still maintained an advantage over Braniff. However, an
individual could drive to San Antonio for $1B, so Southwest
left the price at S15 (Brown, 1990, p. 83). Southwest's
John Dennison, Executive Vice President of Corporate
Services, said "The cost structure at Southwest was set to
entice the customers out of the automobile with speed and
efficienc'j to get from point A to point B, so the customer
could achieve their business purposes." (Interview,
Dennison, 1993)
Putnam looked for other short haul routes that tied to
Texas in order to maintain one crew domicile and maintenance
facility in Dallas (Baumgarner, 1979, p. 81). A single crew
domicile and maintenance base was not only a cost savings,
but fostered an "esprit de corps" within the company
(Henderson, 1982, p. 37).
The airllne hadn't much interest in tha lang haul
flights. Having no meal galilee, Southwest wanted to stao
out of the food business and keep each flight below two
hours. Putnam maintained, "The airline's growth must now be
prudently managed to assure the spirit and positioning isn't
wrecked by building too far, too fast." (Bernstein, 1978,
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p. 78). Foremost in Putnam's plan was continued growth
while maintaining the employee motivation that had been a
key factor in the airline's success. (Southwest Airline
Seeking, 1978, p. 36)
1. A NEW ERA
Putnam left Southwest in 1981 to become president of
financially ailing Braniff, taking with him the Bloom
Advertising Agency. Southwest signed a contract with GSD&N
Advertising in Austin, and vied for a new advertising image.
(Henderson, 1S82, p. 35)
Herb Kelleher, Chairman of the Board, took a permanent
leave of absence from his San Antonio law firm to become CEO
of Southwest. He felt that the "sex and hot pants" campaign
of Southwest had run its course and looked for an
evolutionary transition from "love" to "spirit". (Henderson,
1982, p. 42)
Uniforms were changed to shorts, casual shirts and
sneakers (Appendix B). He insisted that employees call him
"Herb", "Herbie" or "Uncle Herb". His message was, "let's
have fun". (Erickson, 1SB4, p. 22)
Kelleher felt that fun was a stimulant to people. They
could enjoy their work more and be more productive if they
had fun. He also believed that title and position signified
nothing about a person's true worth (Henderson, 1991, p.
38). (Chakravarty, 1991, p. 50 )
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While the US airline industrU in 1981 reported a net
loss of $237 million, Southwest Airline had another Wear of
profitabilitu (8th Wear in a row) declaring a net income of
$34 million (Henderson, 1982, p. 34). A well known and
respected airline analUst at Merrill Lunch, Edmund
Greenslet, stated that in the competitive airline industrU,
an airline "must have a firmlU established business plan and
pursue it diligentlU." (Henderson, 1982, p. 35) Southwest
remained profitable bU sticking to their original plan, low
"no gimmick" fares, frequent flights, easW check-in and
quick turnaround times at the gates. Greenslet rated
Southwest as the highest quality equitU investment in the
airline industrW. (Henderson, 1982, p. 35)
Southwest began a major expansion in 1982 in its route
structure. BU listening to the demands of their customers
over the Wears, the carrier now served Phoenix, San Diego,
Las Vegas, Albuquerque and El Paso. Phoenix was chosen as a
base because no other carrier held a strong identitU there
(Short Haul, 1982, p. 40)
With Southwest's success, people in the industrW
constantlW queried Southwest for the secret to their
success. But Southwest's Bill Franklin, VP Ground
Operations, pointed out that the competition onlW saw part
of them. TheU focused on just one entitU and assumed that
must be the keU, whereas Southwest was actuallU a sum of all
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its parts working together in a well orchestrated
arrangement. As Kelleher put it, "We're the product of
1,000 small decisions, all designed to achieve simplicity."
(Taylor, 1988, p. 108)
H. TRAN-STAR
In 1981 Muse, former CEO at Southwest, started Muse Air,
a commuter service based at Love field mirroring Southwest's
operations. He vied to beat Southwest prices (Nulty, 1981,
p. 48). Muse based his campaign on a strategy of
sophistication, promising a colorful competition with
Southwest. He took off with McDonnell Douglas Super 80s
(155 seats) and 20 minute turn around times compared to
Southwest 737s (118 seats). Muse said, " The 737 was the
low cost, fare-setting plans in the 1970's, but the Super 80
will be the fare setter in the 19BO's." (Bayer, July 1981,
p. 2 )
Southwest was looking to buy some new airplanes but
didn't conform to the industries attraction to Super 80s or
Boeing 757s (Southwest Expects, 1981, p. 42). Southwest
flew just one type of aircraft, the Boeing 737. The
simplicity of one aircraft from both an operational and
maintenance standpoint made sense. They felt that the
benefits derived were less than the long term costs that
would be incurred if they purchased the MD-BOs or the Boeing
757s. Preserving the "KISS" management principle, they
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continued their commitment to the Boeing 737. Southwest
purchased ten new Boeing 737-300 series in June 19B1 at
516.2 million per aircraft. The 737-300s fit 142 seats, was
70% quieter and 20% more fuel efficient than the 737-200s.
(Southwest Buying, 1981, p. 3*)
Muse Air projected an image of luxury even while
offering economical fares. But analysts were concerned about
the large aircraft that they flew, since empty seats excised
the advantage of low costs (Face Off, 1983, p. 17).
Air traffic controllers went on strike at the same time
that Muse commenced operations (Henderson, 1985, p. 4i).
Widely known as "Revenge Air", Muse Air aimed to break
Southwest's hold on the Love-Hobby route. However, it never
turned a profit. When bankruptcy threatened, Kelleher, who
had remained friends with Muse, offered to buy him out for
S67.7 million. Muse accepted. Critics echoed concerns that
Kelleher should not buy the failing Muse Air and needed to
rethink his "KISS" strategy (Weber, 1987, p. 62). Southwest
acquired assets that included six McDonnell Douglas MD-80s
and nine DC-9s from Muse. Kelleher saw the potential for
profit, if the operation was run correctly. Even though
Kelleher would be chairman of both lines, Southwest and Muse
Air were operated as separate entities, but held under a
common airline holding company. (Henderson, 1987, pp. 53-54)
Keeping the operations separate allowed Southwest to
avoid the difficulties of merging different aircraft and
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seniority lists (Shifrin, 1985, p. 43). Muse Air's name was
changed to Tran-Star, but retained it's identity of a two
class service (leather seating in preferred class), hot
meals, assigned seating and a nonsmoking policy. Diverging
philosophies depicted Southwest as a cattle car and Muse Air
as a Cadillac. By acquiring the larger aircraft from Muse,
Southwest now created a corporate branch that specialized in
longer flights (Garland, 1986, 74S). (Henderson, 1987, p.
$5)
The first half of 1987 the airline holding company
(Southwest and Tran-Star) lost $9.2 million, forcing it to
close Tran-Star (Weber, 1987, p. 62).
I. SOUTHWEST GOES MAJOR
Kelleher continued to stress that high productivity, not
low wages, would lower costs. He sought the smaller markets
not pursued by the majors. Kelleher stated, "We're happy
with scraps - lots of little animals get fat on table
scraps." (Henderson, 1987, p. 51)
In 1989 Southwest attained major airline status by
earning more than one billion dollars in annual revenue
(Appendix F). In 18 years it had grown from three aircraft
serving three cities to 94 Boeing 737s serving 27 cities.
One secret revealed by Kelleher was that Southwest was
flexible and could seize initiatives in a hurry. For
example, if Southwest received anticipated slots in a new
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city, within a few days they could reshuffle their inventory
and produce a schedule to accommodate the new service.
(Brown, 1990, p. 5)
Southwest was the first to implement a frequent Flyer
program in the form of "buy several, get one free" discount,
rather than a program based on mileage. This benefited the
short haul traveler more than did other programs (Henderson,
1987, p. 53).
J. EMPLOYEES
In 1990 Southwest was ranked the 8th largest major
airline. Every uear the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DoT) rated the nation's 12 largest airlines in three
categories for the Triple Crown award (Appendix I).
Southwest was the first to receive the top ratings in all
three categories for two years. It had the best on-time
record with 86.9% of its flights arriving promptly; the
lowest baggage loss rate, 3.4 per 1000, and the lowest
customer complaint record, .31 per 100,000. Kelleher
credited Southwest's employees for this record: "They are
the factor that sets us apart from the competition."
(Eisman, 1990, p. 18)
The company didn't keep people by paying higher wages
than other airlines, but by making them feel they're part of
a Family. The employee turnover rate was less than 10%,
unheard of in the airline industry (Castelli, 1990, p. 40).
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An airline analUst for Dean Witter ReUnolds, New York, Mark
Daughertu noted that the management stule at Southwest was a
major factor in its success. DaughertU notes, "There's a
lot of management-emploaee communication and a lot of
recognition, but there's not a lot of hierarchu." (Eisman,
1990, p. 18) Kelleher said,
Southwest has its customers, the passengers, and I have mU
customers, the airline's employees. If the passengers
aren't satisfied, theu won't flU with us. If the
emploWees aren't satisfied theU won't provide the product
we need. The front office was there to support the working
troops, not vice versa. (Brown, MaU, 1991, p. 75)
The management at Southwest treated their emploUees the
same waU that theu expected the emplouees to treat the
customers. Southwest's John Dennison said, "The success of
the companU was made up of a little bit of fate, a little
bit of determination to succeed, but the majoritU of success
came from the people, who all had a tremendous amount to
contribute." (Interview, Dennison, 1993)
The management worked hard at hiring people theU liked,
and who would like each other, and then simplU asked them to
do the veru best job that theU could. OnlU about one in ten
applicants interviewed was deemed to have the effervescent
personalitW Southwest wanted. The People (Personnel)
Department looked for extroverts, people with a sense of
humor who said "we" rather than "I." TheU felt if they
hired people with good attitudes, a specific Job could be
taught. However, attitudes couldn't be taught, no matter
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how much experience or intelligence an individual had. New
hires were sent to the "University for People" located at
Southwest's headquarters in Dallas. Southwest brought in
members of its frequent-Flier program to interview
prospective cabin attendants. They liked to hire people who
matched their customer's personalities. (Henderson, 1991,
p. 37)
The following is an example from Southwest's 75 page
Guideline for Leaders which was available to all employees.
The mission of Southwest Airlines:
Dedication to the highest quality of Customer service
delivered with a sense of warmth, friendliness, individual
pride and company spirit. Creativity and innovation are
encouraged and above all, employees will be provided the
same concern, respect and caring attitude within the
organization that they are expected to share externally
with every customer. (Henderson, 1991, p. 37)
The word "Customer" was always capitalized when used in
ads, brochures or annual reports, to flag employees and the
public that Customers mattered. Both employees and
management worked together to build a cohesive organization
to serve the Customer, as can be seen by the following
examples:
1. Five medical students, who commuted on Southwest
weekly to an out-of-state medical school, complained that
their flight got them to school 15 minutes late. In
response, Southwest moved the departure time up a quarter
hour. (Teitelbaum, 1992, p. 115)
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2. Employees were solicited for ideas to make the
company a better place to work. One of the worker
involvement programs at Southwest was Together We Make It
Great. Employees meet for one hour each week in a seven
member team to come up with money-saving, timesaving or
process-made-easier ideas. Even if an idea wasn't used, the
team received feedback in the form of a letter explaining
why. Awards for the best ideas ranged from cash to
merchandise (Eisman, 1990, p. 18).
3. Kelleher believed that you had to know your troops.
He talked to employees about leadership, rather than
managing or administering. A believer that people want to
be led and not managed, he wanted everyone to be a leader in
their respective Jobs, not in Just what they said, but in
the way they listened and responded to others, in what they
did, and most importantly how they did it (Jaffe, 1991, p.
59).
It was not unusual for Kelleher to show up in the
maintenance hangar at three A.M. to pass out donuts and
coffee and Just chat with the workers. O'Brian of the Wall
Street Journal said, "Even with 11,500 workers, Mr. Kelleher
still attaches the right name to the right face most of the
time." (O'Brian, 1992, p. A7)
4. Each quarter, managers and executives took one day
to work in a different job, for example as a gate agent, a
baggage handler, or flight attendant (but not as a pilot).
Lt 4
This was a reminder of the true worth of every individual in
the company. (Jaffe, 1991, p. 59)
5. A Culture Committee was established to indoctrinate
employees in Southwest's way of doing things (Henderson,
1991, p. 33).
G. Employees created their own catastrophic-assistance
pharity. This program was supported by voluntary payroll
deductions averaging S1.37 per paycheck. It was used by
fellow employees in times of crisis. (Henderson, 1991, p.
37)
7. The employee profit sharing plan (which was really a
retirement plan) was Southwest's largest stock holder. An
employee started to accrue benefits in the profit sharing
plan after one year of employment at Southwest.
At the end of each year, 10% of company profits would be
set aside in the company's profit sharing fund, before being
allocated to an employee's individual account. 5O0 of an
employee's allocation was taken as Southwest stock. The
other SO of allocation was distributed in an employee's
choice of funds. An employee accessed his or her savings by
either retiring or resigning from Southwest. (Interview,
McGlade, 1993)
Instead of reading Plaubou magazine on their lunch
breaks, the employees read the Wall Street Journal to stay
abreast of stock prices and business currents. The
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employees felt they were working for themselves. They
tended to work harder because they wanted to maintain their
profit sharing by maintaining profitability. (Erickson,
198l, p. 22)
8. When Southwest opened in a new city, special SWAT
teams (Soutjiwest Advance Teams) recruited people who would
fit in. Starting up service to Little Rock in 1984,
Southwest ran advertising which was augmented by pilots and
flight attendants knocking on doors handing out schedules to
potential customers (Erickson, 19B8, p. 23). When Southwest
entered a new market it attacked the market and overwhelmed
it with "affordable frequency" (Bayer, 1985, p. 72 ).
(Castelli, 1990, p. 40)
9. Community service was a major part of the employee
motivation program. Employees were involved in the Ronald
McDonald House, Junior Olympics and Muscular Dystrophy
Association. (Eisman, 1990, p. 19-20)
K. UNIONS
The low costs at Southwest were not the product of a
nonunion work force. Each entity of the organization was
represented by a union, e.g. Transport Worker Union (flight
attendants), Teamsters (mechanics) and the Southwest Pilots
Association (pilots). Southwest's Pete McGlade said, "If
the workers don't have representation there can be confusion
in the masses." (Interview, McGlade, 1993)
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Ironically, unions weren't opposed by the management at
Southwest. They recognized a positive relationship between
workers and management which had to be a team effort to make
the company effective and efficient. Traditionally, unions
have been a barrier to such cooperation. (Henderson, 1987,
p. 51)
Because employees knew they had a stake in the
efficient operation of the company, Southwest negotiated
flexible work rules and were able to write labor contracts
devoid of overly restrictive language. Ironically, the work
force was 90 unionized, but owned 11% of the company - the
highest percentage by any major airline (Welles, 1992, p.
46).
L. THE MYTH
Herb Kelleher was the glue which held together this
remarkable culture. A five pack a day smoker, he studied
philosophy and literature at Wesleyan and graduated at the
top of his New York University law school class. Sleeping
only four hours each night and reading two to three books a
week, he was a keen student of military history (Welles,
1992, pp. 44-45).
Kelleher maintained a seat-of-the-pants, hands off
management style (Loeffelholz, 1989, p. 28). He believed
that rigid rules were a substitute for management. He
detested permanent committees because they ended up taking
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on a life of their own. Instead, he liked to set up gd hoc
committees to tackle specific problems. The members could
consist of anyone from executives to baggage handlers. When
a solution was found, the committee was disbanded.
(Henderson, 1991, p. 37)
Kelleher believed that a requisite to working at
Southwest was a sense of humor or "professionalism worn
lightly." Humor, Kelleher believed, could put the world in
perspective and served a serious purpose. He wanted
customers to leave a flight feeling that they just had a
pleasant travel experience, rather than a trip from point A
to point B. This alone would bring customers back for more.
(Why Herb Kelleher, 19B8, p. 114)
Kelleher introduced zaniness and fun to the company,
warning his passengers that traveling Southwest on a holiday
they were likely to find flight attendants and other
employees dressed in outrageous costumes (Bayer, June, 1985,
p. 72). On one flight during the holiday season, flight
attendants were dressed as reindeer and elves while the
pilots gently rocked the plane back and forth singing
Christmas carols over the intercom (Kelly, 1989, p. 53).
Kelleher encouraged employees to act as delegates of the
"fun" marketing position. Perhaps Kelleher's "fun" was used
to disguise the lack of services such as hot meals and
interlining (checking baggage through to a different
4B
airlineý, the kind competitors guaranteed to all their
passengers (Hiestand, 1969, p. 31).
A bright individual, but self admittedly, sometimes a
"bit of a scatterbrain" Kelleher once rushed to catch a
flight from Dallas to Houston but then stopped his car in a
loading zone to chat with a friend. Arriving in Houston an
hour later, a Southwest employee asked him if he knew where
he left his car. "In the parking lot?" Kelleher asked. No.
He had left it idling at curbside in Love field, Dallas.
(Kelly, 1989, p. 53)
As a promoter of good humor, Kelleher naturally enjoyed
a practical joke. For the opening of Sea World in San
Antonio in 1988, Kelleher had one of his 737s painted to
look like a killer whale. Robert Crandall, CEO of American
Airlines called to congratulate Herb on this clever
marketing scheme, but asked him where he was planning to
dump the waste. A week later, Kelleher sent a messenger
with his response to Crandall in the middle of his staff
meeting - with a large tub of chocolate mousse and a spoon
(Kelly, 1989, p. 53)1
Kelleher appeared in many of Southwest's TV commercials.
In 1989 America West ran an ad charging that Southwest
passengers should be embarrassed by flying on a no-frills
airline. In response, Kelleher did a TV commercial with a
bag over his head. He offered the bag to any Southwest
Lj9
passenger, suggesting that it be used for the extra money
they saved by flying Southwest. (Kelly, 19B9, p. 55)
Kelleher started the Friday "Fun Day" uniforms, when
employees were free to wear casual clothes and hold
cookouts. One Friday, Kelleher showed up to a board meeting
at the second largest bank in Texas looking for a multi-
million dollar loan while wearing khaki pants and a red
sweatshirt. It was Friday' (Weber, 1987, p. 58)
M. STRATEBY
According to David Brown of Aviation Week and Space
Technology, Southwest continued to grow big by thinking
small and was ready to undertake the future by keeping its
eye on the past (Brown, May, 1991, p. 75). Take care of
your people and keep a sharp focus on costs was the decree
that was echoed throughout the company (Interview, Dennison,
1993). Don Burr founded People's Express with the idea of
making it the Southwest of the northeast, but before long
was lured into the profit and prestige of the long haul
flights. Burr expanded too quickly by trying to establish a
hub to the west. He bought Frontier Airlines in Denver, but
soon perished. PSA didn't seem to have a sense of history
about what made them successful. When they were finally
sold to US Air they were a different airline than when they
started. Southwest vowed not to lose their sense of
history. With 30 cities in 1990 petitioning Southwest to
so
serve their areas reaffirmed to Southwest that they had the
right formula. (Loeffelholz, 1989, p. 27)
Kelleher acknowledged the temptation to grow and expand
to new cities, but believed more importantlU to take a slow,
conservative approach and maintain a strong financial
position (Southwest Expects, 1981, 42).
Southwest never allowed success to seduce it into
straying from the niche theU created for themselves. They
were still the nation's only high frequency, short distance,
low fare airline. TheU did not get into a head-to-head
competition with larger airlines (ChakravartU, 1991, p. 48).
TheU searched for markets that were overpriced and
underserved. These tended to be smaller cities where the
airport was closer to downtown and was less congested.
Southwest would open a new route only after careful
consideration - then it moved with considerable force
attacking with a high volume a&J frequencU of flights. This
achieved two points:
1. It spread Southwest's fixed costs over more seats
2. Provided the customer with a lot of options
(Welles, 1992, p. 46)
Kelleher believed that you had to know what your
capabilities were and to exercise proper Judgment. He saw
Southwest as fighting on the flanks, as opposed to the
center of the activity where the opposition could mass its
forces (Chakravarty, 1991, pp. 4B-49). Growth for growth's
51
sake was not an objective that Southwest pursued, as
evidenced by its avoidance of major hubs in favor of close-
in airports (Henderson, 1991, p. 36).
Southwest had a strong propensity to place profit ahead
of market share (Feldman, 1992, p. 71). They could do good
in the bad times and very good in the good times, but only
by not allowing spending to get out of control. Long term
existence was the result of taking care of costs today.
(Interview, Dennison, 1993)
In this consumer industry, costs determined the extent
of revenues. Kelleher observed that after deregulation
other airlines grew at alarming rates, exposing their
companies to high financial risk and high costs. He vowed
not to repeat those mistakes at Southwest. (Feldman, 1992,
p. 70)
N. CALIFORNIA
In 1989 USAir decided to reduce its service in
California. Southwest jumped into the California corridor,
which was defined as the 15 routes connecting five airports
in the Los Angeles basin with three in the San Francisco Bay
area. This market attracted eight million passengers per
year, making it the busiest corridor in the coLuntry
(Zellner, 1992, p. 4B). (Brown, May, 1992, p. 32)
The goal of Southwest was to attract passengers who had
never, or rarely flown because of cost (Nelms, 1991, p. 66).
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Southwest simply took out their "cookie cutter" and did the
same thing in the California market. They charged an
unrestricted one-way fare of S59 on any intrastate route.
By contrast, the full coach fare on other arrivals between
San Francisco International and Los Angeles International
was S220. (Henderson, 1991, p. 33)
Air traffic on the Oakland-Ontario route increased 123%
in the first quarter that Southwest flew. Southwest drove
down market prices and as a result, American, USAir and
United suffered losses. (Zellner, 1992, p. 4B)
In April 1993 Southwest Airline announced the arrival of
full service out of San Jose International (SJI) to begin
June 1, 1993. Within hours, American Airlines, whose hub is
SJI, announced that it would eliminate 50% of their flights
from that airport. Competition from SWA would be too great.
Ralph Tonseth, San Jose's Aviation Director, declared,
"Southwest is a real phenomenon. It stimulates the market
by having such low prices." (Sweeney, 1993, p. 21A)




A. AN ABE OF INFORMATION
1. Background
The total spending for information technology (IT)
in 1980 was about $120 billion, and has been growing at a
rate of about 15% annually since then (Sprague, 1993, pp. 5-
6).
In the early 1960s batch processing was predominant
with on-line systems emerging in the late 1960s. With the
advent of the personal computer in the 1980s processing
power accelerated away from a central site to a single user.
In the 1990s, a strong trend toward cooperative processing,
which is computers working together, emerged. (Sprague,
1993, pp. 6-7)
By the 1990s users were tired of being locked into
proprietary system in both hardware and software. A push
for open systems evolved. An open system allowed different
products to work together, known as interoperability;
however, the cost for the interface conversion would be
efficiency. (Sprague, 1993, pp. 7-8)
Telecommunications is an integral component of
information technology. "Communications-based information
systems link organizations to suppliers and customers."
(Sprague, 1993, p. 9) In the late 1S80s local area networks
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MLANS) began to emerge furthering the age of information.
In the iSBOs, these LANS were interconnected to wide area
networks (WANS). WANS were leading to computer connectivitW
among information workers, similar to the level of voice
connectivitU provided bU the worldwide telephone sUstem. The
growth of this network infrastructure will complete the
shift from mainframe-centered to work station-centric
computing that began in the 198Os. (Sprague, 1993, p. 9)
2. Business Environment
In the market place, the speed at which events occur
and the pace at which individuals and organizations can
respond to events is paramount.
There have been two main areas of change that
effected the market place:
a. Changes in the economic environment caused executives
to re-examine how their firms competed to be successful. It
used to be that quality meant reducing defects in product
output. Now, quality was defined by the customer. Customer
satisfaction forced management's attention on the key
business processes in the organization. Information Systems
was a key resource for examining and reengineering those
processes to improve overall performance.
b. Changes in the work environment. There was a shift
from depending on chains of command and the authority of a
boss to emphasizing teams to accomplish major tasks and
projects. Task oriented teams were organized to work
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together on a team project long enough to accomplish the
task, then were disbanded. This concept of teamwork caused
the development of information systems called groupware,
which promotes collaborative work and enriches
communications among team members. (Sprague, 19S3, pp. 11-
13)
3. Mlssion of Information Technology
In the early transaction processing days, IT was
concerned with throughput, the number of transactions
processed per dau. During the 1900s the focus shifted to
producing summaru reports or management bU exception. The
goal was to get the right information to the right person at
the right time. But this was not enough. The 1990s
demanded performance improvement in the organization and one
of the resources used was information technologu. (Sprague,
1993, pp. 13-14)
4. IT as a Competitive Tool
Organizations use IT as competitive tools in two
ways: to beat their competition and to staU alive. "Those
who do not keep up can fall so far behind that they are no
longer competitive; theu are acquired bw the more nimble
enterprises." (Sprague, 1993, p. 69)
Top management of organizations recognize IT as
influencing the competitive measures of earnings, market
share, and developing new ventures. Electronically linking
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a companu with its suppliers or customers is a must to
capture market share. But using IT in an organization will
not guarantee success. Applying IT to outmoded business
practices is a futile process. "The 1980. search for
achieving competitive advantage with IT taught an important
lesson: merslU automating current ways of working yields
little." (Sprague, 1993, p. 68) Reengineering of processes
is an important step in order to take advantage of
technology. (Sprague, 1993, p. 69)
B. IT AT SOUTHWEST
In terms of a discipline, Information Technology (IT)
didn't dictate how Southwest wanted to operate as a
business. However, IT did accommodate their ability to
operate more efficientlU. IT was chosen based on a business
application and a cost for that technology. Technology was
not procured for the sake of technology. To procure
technology, two questions were asked by Southwest:
1. Does it make sense?
2. Is there a need?
(Interview, Dennison, 1993)
Decisions for procurement were not based on the fact
that everybody else in the business had a certain
technology, or that Southwest should have it because they
were now a major carrier. IT was viewed as something that
Southwest had to have available in order to be competitive,
but cost was always a major consideration. The requirements
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and specifications concerning their business applications
were first determined and developed. If an information
system could be used to aid in a process, consideration was
then given to that system. (Interview, Dennison, 1993)
Southwest took what some would perceive as a low
technology approach to IT because they didn't belong to a
major computer reservation system (CRS), which would cost
$25 million annually. The focus at Southwest was always to
think in terms of a revenue management perspective, to
maximize the revenues received. Southwest's John Dennison,
Executive V.P. (Corporate Services), believed that you
couldn't just look at that one extra incremental unit, but
what impact that unit would have on the entire system. A
most benefit analysis conducted on participation in a CRS
might show a positive value for the one incremental unit at
the margin. This would indicate that Southwest should
participate in such a system. However, Southwest looked at
the impact that one incremental unit would have on the
entire system, the way they did business. Spending that
extra S25 million annually would mean that fares would have
to increase. Southwest would lose their competitive
advantage to their chief competitor, the automobile.
Therefore, the de,.ision was made not to participate in the




The two main reservation systems in the airline
industry were AMR's Semi-Automated Business Resource
Environment (SABRE) and United Airline's (UA) APOLLO
reservation system. AMR is the parent company of Imerican
Airlines (AA). Both AA and UA sold reservation services to
other airlines.
Early in the deregulation years, AA and UA biased
travel agent's computer screen displays. A travel agent
queried the computer system to supply the best fare or route
for a customer. UA or AA would automatically show their
flights first, regardless if they weren't superior to
another participating airline's fare or routing.
Subsequently, the other airline's flights would show on the
travel agent's screen. This did not necessarily give the
consumer the best deal Protests and civil litigation
ensued. (Kahan, 199?, p. 23)
An investigation by the Department of Justice in
19BE-1983 concluded that serious problems existed. Because
of the injustices and violations of antitrust standards, AA
and UA could have been divested from their reservation
systems. However, the Justice Department chose to deal
with the abuse by imposing regulation rather to require
divestiture in December 1984. (Kahan, 1992, pp. 2S-26)
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The bias against competitor's flights were
eliminated, but in return AA and UA charged other airlines
uniformly high booking fees, with no retribution from the
Department of Transportation CDoT). The airlines that did
not own their own CRSs transferred a significant portion of
their profits to AA or UA. For Southwest the portion of
their profits would be S25 million annually. (Kahan, 1992,
p. 26)
2. SABRE SWstom
The SABRE System was built by American Airlines
in the mid iS60s to reduce the costs of making airline
seat reservations. In the mid 1970s, American offered
the system to travel agents, which allowed agents to make
reservations directly through on-line terminals. AA added
functions to SABRE which allowed travel agents to prepare
trip itineraries. Travel agents enjoyed the direct access
capability. In the late 1970s SABRE was expanded to include
reservations for hotels and rental cars. AA was
transforming itself from an airline to a travel company.
(Sprague, 1993, p. 54)
3. AMR TuchnologW Group
The AMR Technology Group is based in Dallas, Texas.
There are four primary divisions which fall under the
technology group:
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a. Decision Technology - deals in research and special
operations.
b. SABRE Computer Services - is composed of programmers
and operations for hardware.
c. AMR Information Services (AMRIS) - offered two
internal reservation systems to airlines:
1. SABRE: This system offered a full amenities
package to airlines. It could accommodate
such thing3 as assigned seating, in-flight
meals, hotel reservations, interlining and car
rentals.
2. SAAS: This system only offered a limited
capability of reservations, i.e. passenger
information.
(Telephone, Carbonell, 1993)
As of July 1993, 30 airlines used SAAS and 20
airlines used the SABRE systems (Telephone, Smith, 1993).
TABLE '.i COMPARABLE COSTS FOR SAAS and SABRE
SAAS SABRE
One Time Implementation
Fee S 30K S 70K
Monthly Minimum Fee $ 2.5K $ SK
(Telephone, Smith, 1993)
d. SABRE Travel Information Network (STIN) - This is the
actual Computer Reservation Sgrtem (CRS) that links
the travel agents to the various airlines. Two levels
of participation are offered.
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1. Level I - a travel agent's computer monitor
would only show the airline's flight schedule
and fares. If the customer decided to Fly with
an airline, a travel agent would call that
airline's central reservation facility to make a
booking.
2. Level II - a travel agent viewed a monitor for
flight schedules, fares and seat availability.
Travel agents could then link to an airline's
central reservation facility and make a booking.
Level II provides on-line confirmation of a seat
booking. The cost involved would be paid by the
airline.
(Telephone, Carbonell, 1993)
4. EarlU Years - SWA's Reservations System
The reservation system at Southwest was unique in
that it didn't follow the norms of the industry. The first
reservation system was the Bunker Ramo system, originally
designed by Paul McDuFFy for PSA in California. It was
nothing more than an inventory system which stored only the
passenger's name. No data such as passenger's address or
price quoted was kept on record. CTelephone, Carbonell,
1993)
The Bunker Ramo system had a 211 inch screen and
seven keys, lettered A through G. The operators of this
system were located at headquarters in Dallas and had no
computer link with travel agents. If a passenger wanted to
book a flight from Houston to Dallas he made a telephone
call to the Southwest Reservation office. An operator would
manually consult a schedule binder because schedules were
not part of the information system. The operator would then
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punch the "D1" key and enter the passenger's name For a
particular flight. There were only two fares in the
beginning, and by virtue of what time of day that you were
Flying, a fare was selected. (Interview, Johnson, 1993)
In 19B7 former Southwest President Muse said, "Part
of the problem was Southwest's lack of a sophisticated
reservation system. When there's a change in technology and
you don't participate, you get left behind and everybody
loses their jobs." (Weber, 1967, p. 58) Southwest was
growing and a more complex Fare structure was introduced.
There was a need for a new computer reservation system
(Weber, 1987, p. 58).
Southwest swapped out its in-house reservation
system for AMR information services' Sabre Automated Airline
System (SAAS) in 1987. This system was originally Braniff's
"Cowboy" Reservation System. When Braniff went out of
business Southwest had the opportunity to buy it, but
declined because the programmers required to run the system
were collectively paid $100 thousand per year, a cost
Southwest wasn't willing to incur. Another airline picked
up the system, but when it failed a few years later
Southwest was again offered this system. Declining a second
time, AMR stepped in and offered to buy the system, with the
stipulation that Southwest would be one of its' primary
clients. Southwest agreed and signed a three year contract
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for services. AMR made some modifications to the "Cowboy"
system and changed the name to SAAS.
5. Southwest's Choice
a. SW's Internal Reservation Sustem
Southwest was not interlining (checking bags
through to another airline), flying international, or
offering assigned seating or meals. Therefore they didn't
require all the functions that SABRE offered. SAAS was also
considerably less expensive than SABRE (Table 4.i).
Southwest selected AMR's SAAS system as their internal
reservation system. (Henderson, 1987, p. 54)
b. SW's CRS
Southwest was unique in that it did not share a
major airline's computer reservation system (CRS), which was
considered to be an essential marketing tool in the airline
world (Sutton, 1989, p. 4l8). STIN offered two levels of
participation. Southwest chose Level I participation in the
CRS (Telephone, Carbonell, 1993). The cost to participate
in Level I was $1.85 for each leg of a flight reserved
(Telephone, Smith, 1993). Southwest's V.P. of Systems Jim
Brunjen likened it to SABRE's full blown Computer
Reservation System without the "bells and whistles"
(Henderson, 1987, 54).
The extra cost to participate in the full CRS (Level
II) was approximately $25 million annually, or paying $2.60
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for each leg of a flight reserved (Telephone, Smith, 1993).
This would have taken a serious cut out of Southwest's
relatively small average fare, too large a percentage of the
revenues. The incremental cost to participate in SABRE's
Level II overrode the incremental income. (Brown, 1990, p.
83)
Inconvenience and extra time spent by a travel agent
was an opportunity cost to Southwest. Many travel agents
found it too time consuming to deal with Southwest unless by
specific customer request. Says former Southwest V.P. Tom
Volz, "Southwest's reservation system annoys travel agents.
The travel agent, for better or worse, controls a hell of a
lot of business." (Weber, 1987, p. 58)
But Kelleher was not eager to change his philosophy.
He affirmed that amenities only drove up costs and were not
required. Some wondered why Southwest didn't Just raise
their prices and participate in the Level II CRS. Southwest
believed that an increase in prices would dampen the traffic
volume upon which they relied. Kelleher believed that
customers already knew Southwest's schedules, due to heavy
advertising, and would make a conscious effort to choose
Southwest for the service and value the airline offered.
(Sutton, 1989, p. q18)
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0. AIRPLANES
Ordinarily new Boeing 737s were delivered in 1992 fully
outfitted with digitized cockpit gauges and flight
instruments. These instruments provided information on an
aircraft's performance and location, vital to the safe
conduct of any flight. However, a new Boeing 737 delivered
to Southwest still had the old analog gauges and
instruments. By buying airplanes with digitized
instrumentation Southwest would have had to carry an
additional five million dollars in inventory for the two
different cockpit configurations. (Interview, McGlade,
1953)
The analog system was still being used in military
aircraft and was both functional and safe. Once again, cost
was the decisive factor in Southwest's decision to maintain
the older analog system.
E. AUTOMATIC TICKET MACHINES
A network of new Southwest Quick-It automatic ticket
machines (ATM) were used in airports that Southwest served.
They accepted credit cards and used touch-screen ease to
issue a plane ticket within 20 seconds.
These machines were designed by a group of employees at
Southwest who thought up the idea one night at a bar. They
built the machines in their spare time using off-the-shelf
computer parts. (Welles, 1992, p. 47)
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The interior of the machine was a 386 Personal Computer
with a modem. The cost of the ATMs were S$S,000 each. When
a customer swiped a credit card, the machine interacted with
SAAS through a modem and verified the customer's credit
card. A ticket received by a customer was a ticket to a
destination, no specific time or flight wai indicated.
Tickets issued were for unrestricted fares Ls' class) only.
(Telephone, Kensiar, 1993)
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V. SOUTHWEST IN THE 1950.
A. 1990 - 1992
1990 was a Uear of gathering recession, Iraq invaded
Kuwait, and Fuel prices surged. Only three U.S. major
airlines posted operating and net profits (Table 5.1).
Operating profits are made up of revenues minus direct
operating costs such as personnel, depreciation, insurance,
Fuel and leases. Net profits are the operating profits
minus the net interest expenses and taxes.
TABLE 5.1 AIRLINE PROFITS - 1990
OPERATING PROFITS
American Airlines S 68 million
Southwest Airlines S 81.9 million
NET PROFITS
Southwest Airlines S '7.1 million
United Airlines S 95.8 million
Southwest was the onlW airline in the black in both the
operating and net-income columns in 1990.
Southwest emploUees created the Fuel from the Heart
program to bug fuel for their airline through payroll
deductions. This was to help deFraW the rising prices of
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fuel during the Gulf War. Kelleher didn't know about the
program until he received a banner signed by the 3,000 out
of 8,600 employees that voluntarily participated. Kelleher
responded, "It wasn't so much the money as the attitude that
I loved. It indicated that the spirit of Southwest Airlines
was alive." (Chakravarty, 1991, p. 50)
In 1591 Southwest had the lowest debt to equity ratio
C35.1%) and the highest credit rating of any U.S. carrier.
Southwest entered the year with $100 million in cash and a
$215 million revolving credit line (Appendix F). For 58
consecutive quarters the line paid its shareholders a
dividend. (Henderson, 1991, p. 33)
Southwest had been allowed to grow as fast as possible
without sacrificing service or a sound balance sheet.
Southwest received the coveted Airline of the Year Award
from Air Transport World in 1991 for overall excellence in
the airline industry (18th Annual, 1992, p. 51) (Appendix
H). (Henderson, 1991, p. 32)
Southwest's cost per available-seat-mile was still the
lowest in the industry at 6.5 cents. In contrast, American
Airlines was 9 cents and USAir was 15 cents. This number
takes on greater significance when you consider that
Southwest planes take off and land more often than any other
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airline, so the fuel rate consumption is greater and the
number of landing fees it must pay is greater. (Welles,
1992, p. 47)
In 1992 Southwest had $303 million cash, a S250 million
credit line and paid cash for 13 new Boeing 737s. In the
past three years, they had moved into California, the
Midwest and Las Vegas. A strong balance sheet, enabled them
to enter new markets despite the Gulf War (fuel price
explosion) and a recession. They were ranked as the seventh
largest airline in the United States in 1992. (Brown, May,
1992, pp. 56-57)
In October 1992 Moneu magazine published a study
depicting the ten best stocks for a 20 year period C1972 -
1992). Southwest was ranked as the number one buy.
$1,000 invested in Southwest in 1972 was worth $217,775 in
1992. (Alderman, 1992, pp. 132-133)
B. SWA LOOKS TO THE FUTURE
During the lean iS9Os, many of the major airlines, other
than Southwest, were looking for ways to reduce unnecessary
costs. These airlines questioned such areas as interlining,
assigned seating, in-flight meals and other amenities which
were considered to be routine on many lines, but absent on
Southwest. (Brown, April, 1992, pp. 32-33)
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Our problem [Robert Baker, executive V.P. of AA] is the
same uou face when uou find you can buy the same gift
at both Wal-Mart and MacU's. Macy's will wrap it for
you. Is that enough to overcome the attraction of the
lower price you will pay at Wal-Mart? (Brown, April,
1992, p. 32 )
The questior is how much the consumer is willing to pay
for service? Will an attitude toward reduced costs invade
the niche that Southwest has created for themselves?
Facing a rapid growth rate in the SOs, Southwest could
end up with a number of older ane louder aircraft that they
either no longer need or the aircraft will not meet new
environmental standards (noise pollution). Southwest solved
this problem by initiating a selling and lease-back program.
They sold five older airplanes each year and then leased
them back. This way Southwest released aircraft that they no
longer needed or meet the environmental standards.
Fifty-eight percent of Southwest's fleet of 128 aircraft
in 1993 were owned and 42% were leased. SWA looked forward
to achieving a 50-50 split of owned/leased in the future.
Through the selling and lease-back program, SWA were able to
avoid the risk of technological obsolescence and acquire the
latest equipment with little money down. This in turn
retained a strong cash reserve.
Southwest continued to fly the Boeing 737s, however,
Kelleher would consider a larger aircraft such as the 757
only if the airports become so congested that SWA would have
to reduce its frequencies. (Henderson, 1991, p. 36)
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Because Southwest is now flying into more congested
airports such as Los Angeles International and carrying more
cargo, its turnaround time now averages 20 minutes compared
to an industry average of 55 minutes. (Henderson, 1991, p.
37) However, there are no plans to expand into the
northeast because of congestion both on the ground and in
the airspace. It wouldn't help to turn an aircraft in 20
minutes if it had to sit on the taxiway for an hour waiting
to take off. (Henderson, 1991, p. 37)
C. 1990's PRICING
As Southwest grew, it was no longer Just the
businessperson's airline. Passengers were carrying large
suitcases rather than brief cases. Due to passenger demands
and competition, Southwest could no longer operate on Just a
two tier price structure. In 1990 with the introduction of
frequent fliers and advance purchase discounts, Southwest
had to resort to a more complex pricing structure.
(Interview, McGlade, 1993)
D. THE SAME OLD THING
Sometimes Southwest management ask themselves if they
should continue to be the same type of airline. "Based on
their record of profitability and history, they will Just
keep doing the same thing in more places and being their old
humdrum selves." (Henderson, 1991, p. 38) No matter what
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location that Southwest goes to, three things quicklw
happen:
1. fares are reduced
2. traffic usually increases threefold
3. Southwest develops a fervent following (evidenced
bU achieving a number one position in enplaning
passengers over their competitors, usually within
the first six months)
Kelleher advises his people that there is security in
change. There Is nothing passive about the airline business
when your principal assets are moving at 540 knots.
Ironically, he fears the absence of change, the lulling
sense of calm that can overtake "successful" companies.
Kelleher says, "Our Job is to never lose focus on keeping
our costs low and to never suffer an excess of hubris so we
take on too much debt." (Welles, 1992, p. 47) Kelleher
looks to increase Southwest seats by a modest 15% each year
and to reach $2 billion in revenues by 1995. (Welles, 1992,
pp. 46-j7)
Kevin Murphy, Morgan Stanley's airline analyst likens
SWA to an amoeba that keeps growing little by little through
the United States. Murphy says, "Southwest's stock Just
won't quit. It is the Wal-Mart of the skies." (Welling,
1992, p. 24)
Of course there is a concern of what will happen to
Southwest after Herb Kelleher (Chakravarty, 1991, p. 51).
Puffing on one of his 100 cigarettes per day, Herb Kelleher
claims to have a rare disease. Having floppy arteries and
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veins, the smoke helps to constrict them, allowing the flow
of blood to his head. (Kelleher, 1988, p. 16)
The 53 year old Kelleher insists that there are three or
four people who could be successful at being CEO of
Southwest. Kelleher says, "There's no real magic involved
here. Keep it simple, be smart about costs, take care of
your people, and don't try to be something that you're not
seems to be the formula which keeps this airline on the




This chapter analyzes the case study in the form of a
teaching note. The teaching note has three sections.
Section One contains questions for the purpose of helping
a student prepare for the case analysis or to aid in
generating class discussion. Section Two is a summary of
the case study. Section Three covers the major issues or
problems that appear in the case study. The identifi.cation
of the issues serve as potential lecture material for the
case study when used in a classroom setting. Section Four
is the analysis of the case.
B. CASE STUDY TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
- As Southwest maintains a steady growth, can Kelleher
continue the family atmosphere that currently exists
among the employees?
Southwest's goal is to achieve $2 billion in annual
revenues by 199S. Can they still maintain this
CRS or will they have to submit to the larger
reservation systems and incur the greater costs?
With a 15% annual growth rate, will Southwest Airline
be able to maintain their simplistic philosophy (KISS)
which has brought them so much success, e. g. maintain
one type of aircraft, no food served, no interlining or
no assigned seating?
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One of the major reasons that Southwest has been so
successful is that they are unique and do things
differently from other airlines. As more airlines
change their own structures to reflect that of
Southwest, will that uniqueness eventually disappear
and Southwest fall into oblivion as just another
commuter?
As members of DoD, are there any principles that
Southwest adheres to that we could adopt into our own
business decisions (i.e. procurement of ADP) in the
future?
As DoD members are we as sensitive to cost issues as
Southwest is?
In the military, we are used to dealing with multi-
million dollar pieces of equipment (i.j. jet aircraft,
ships, tanks, etc.). Concerned mainly with the
operation of this equipment, we generally don't concern
ourselves with the cost of procurement. Do you think
this financial unaccountability attitude could be
carried into your next assignment dealing with
procurement of ADP? If so, how will it effect your
future business decisions?
Southwest has never been quick to go along with popular
trends in the industry, e.g. they stayed with Boeing
737s vice switching to MD-BOs; they didn't participate
in a major carrier's CRS. Was their purpose to simply
stand alone or are were these good business decisions?
As military members what lessons learned here can we
bring to our future jobs in ADP acquisition?
In 1990 Southwest changed a simple two tier pricing
system to accommodate their passengers demands and to
remain competitive in the industry. If Southwest is
starting to move toward more complex systems and
structures, what impact will this have on Southwest's
overall standing in the airline community?
As DoD members, can we apply Southwest's cost saving
techniques to ir business activities, such as re-
engineering, scftware reuse and hardware reuse?
One aspect of T(L is to provide full support and
cooperation by a vendor to a customer. What vendor-
customer relationship techniques does Southwest
practice and how can they be implemented in the DoD?
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2. Case Summary
This case pertains to Southwest Airline, a
relatively new airline based in Dallas. Descriptions of
Southwest's mission, goals, organization, business
decisions, attitude, growth, and information technology are
discussed. The primary focus is the fact that Snuthwest
does not participate in a major carrier's reservation
system, and yet it still proves to be successful and
profitable.
3. Major Issues
- Southwest has developed a niche in short haul, high
frequency, no frills transportation market. They
experience a tremendous profit by offering the lowest
fares in the industry.
- Southwest Airlines pays particularly close attention to
costs in all business facets, and it places profit
ahead of market share.
- Southwest was the first airline to participate in an
employee profit sharing plan. This unionized force
owns 11% of the company.
- Southwest uses one type of aircraft, a Boeing 737, to
standardize maintenance, training, and inventory costs.
- Southwest does not attempt to comlete with other
airlines but with the automobile, and attracts
passengers that would not otherwise travel by air.
- Southwest uses a point to point system rather than
the industry's norm, a hub system.
- An unusual attitude toward team work and accomplishing
goals exists among the enthusiastic, fun-loving,
unionized workers.
- Southwest uses the KISS philosophy in every aspect of
its' business.
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Southwest does not use a major carrier's Computer
Reservation System (CRS).
Southwest bought out failing Muse Air and formed Tran
Star. In 1987 a loss of S9.2 million was reported and
Tran Star was dissolved.
Southwest's ten minute turnaround time became a
trademark and was actually born out of operational
necessity rather than good planning.
Souti-Aest first determines their specific business
applications, then lastly seeks information technology
to help automate the process.
4. Case Analysis
a. Southwest - The Airline
This scrappy little commuter in 23 years has
evolved into the top money making airline in the U.S. today.
In the private sector, success is measured by profits and by
this definition alone, Southwest has been very successful.
Over a 20 year study, Lesley Alderman of Monew
magazine rated Southwest as being the number one company to
have invested in, yielding the highest return to investors
for that period (Alderman, 1992, p. 132). Southwest has
received numerous Airline of the Year awards, Triple Crown
awards, and employees rate SWA airline as the best company
to work for.
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It is impossible to look at Just one aspect of
Southwest and say that is why they are successful. One must
look at the sum of all its parts. SWA is a made up of many
different aspects:
a. How well they treat their employees and customers
b. Drive for profit over market share; maintain a strong
financial position
c. Sensitivity to cost issues
d. As more power is obtained Southwest becomes more aware
of the mortality associated with hubris
e. Not trying to be something they're not; don't stray
from your niche
f. Remain protective of the history at Southwest and
competitors
g. First define needs, then procure technoloogy to
enhance the process
Every aspect overlaps each other's boundaries,
creating a well orchestrated organization which is
completely integrated; yet managed by simple processing
methods.
b. Human Resources
During the interview process and from the
articles referenced in this thesis, Southwest executives
each discuss elements of Southwest which contribute to its
overall success. Each executive insisted that there is no
magic formula about the successful operation at Southwest
and that it's simply common sense. Southwest has narrowed
it down to a simple slogan: Take care of your people and
watch your costs. They believe that the most important
resource at Southwest is Southwest employees. The SW
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executives treat SW employees the same way that they expect
the SW employees to treat SW customers.
Southwest practices TOL principles, without
preaching TOL. Southwest executives want their employees to
be involved in decisions and policy making by encouraging
feedback from those people working in the trenches, e.g.,
Tooether We Make It Great program and their use of "ad hoc"
committees. The S.W. executives value members of the
company and understand that each member has a tremendous
amount to contribute.
From their beginnings, Southwest let customers
define quality for the airline. Southwest provided service
to cities that customers requested and allowed customers to
participate in the SW attendant hiring process.
Kelleher seems to be keenly aware of the human
condition and how power can ruin both an organization and an
individual. His constant reminder to both himself and the
Southwest c:ganization of the sin of hubris shows an
acknowledgement and respect for one's position in life and
how fragile that can be.
With their tremendous success and having the
highest profits of all major airlines, Kelleher still
realizes that their niche is that of a short haul, no
frills, high frequency airline. Kelleher makes no pretense
of taking on the larger major airlines (e.g., AA or UA with
over 600 aircraft compared to SW's 140 aircraft). As
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Kelleher says, "We're happy with scraps - lots of little
animals get fat on table scraps." (Henderson, 1987, p. 51)
c. Southwemt's IT
A factor that makes Southwest unique is its lack
of a major airline's computer reservation system. The IT
world considers a major reservation system an essential tool
for major airlines to simply exist; yet not only is
Southwest existing without a major system, but in terms of
profits, is proving to be successful.
Cost is always the major consideration in
business decisions at Southwest. However, their purpose was
not to procure low technoloy because it was less expensive.
Southwest views IT exactly what it was designed to do, to
enhance applications and link the customer with an
organization. In terms of a reservation system, Southwest
looked at the functionality of both the SABRE and less
expensive SAAS systems. SWA wasn't interlining, assigning
seats or serving meals on their flights so those functions
weren't required. SWA also selected a CRS which only showed
their flights on a travel agent's monitor and relied on the
agent to place a telephone call to make a reservation. But
the important point here is that Southwest wasn't lured into
thinking that since they were a major airline there was a
perceived need for the bigger and more expensive SABRE
system. Known in the IT world as "bells and whistles" or
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"gold-plating" IT vendors can sometimes offer customers
attractive more expensive systems when no need actually
exists.
In Chapter IV, Sprague describes
telecommunications as an integral component of i1 which
links organizations to suppliers and customers. Sprague
goes on to say, "those who do not keep up can fall so far
behind that they are no longer competitive." (Sprague,
1993, p. 69)
A business person reading that quote could
easily interpret it to mean that if he doesn't keep up with
the latest technology, his business will never survive. He
goes on to establish his paradigm for IT. A paradigm is a
set of rules for the way an individual views something, in
this case IT. His IT paradigm is now defined as the latest
technology being the best and is necessary for him to stay
competitive.
Southwest's IT paradigm is defined in a much
broader sense. It not only includes the latest technology,
but also the older technologies and communication mediums.
Just because a technology is obsolete, Southwest doesn't
discount it. It is still a viable option. Southwest's
method of reaching its customers is made up of the
following:
82










c. Telephone Links the
(travel agent calls organization
SWA Reservation) and the
customer
Through the combination of new and old
technologies Southwest links their organization with a
customer. By choosing the less expensive, already
established technologies, SW can achieve the same business
purposes.
d. Training
The hiring and training process of flight
attendants is unique at Southwest. In accordance with TOL
principles, Southwest goes directly to the customer to
determine what their expectations are. By actively
participating in the flight attendent selection process,
customers act as a feedback mechanism to the Southwest
People (personnel) Department. SW satisfies customer's
expectations by delivering a product that a customer




By following a KISS philosophy, Southwest keeps
things in a growing company from getting too difficult to
control. Keeping everything simple seems to work well with
this company.
To Southwest, purchasing different aircraft
other than 737s seemed to be redundant. Different aircraft
would provide the same function, but the methods might
differ. Kelleher was criticized by peers in the industry
that he wasn't keeping up with the times and that he should
purchase different aircraft. But to Kelleher, the
complexity of different aircraft involved both operationally
and maintainability just didn't make sense. Having
redundant systems would be too costly.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Southwest is unusual in its strange propensitu to place
profit over market share (Feldman, 1992, p. 71). During the
19BOs manu other major airlines rnuldn't expand quick
enough. These airlines wanted to secure as much market
share as possible, no matter what the cost. The main
consideration has always been cost at Southwest and not
allowing themselves to live beyond their means. This
formula has breed success at Southwest. As a result, some
of the other majors are trying to imitate the leader,
Southwest, by trimming away the amenities that Southwest
never adhered to (Feldman, 1992, pp. 70-74).
Herb Kelleher realizes the he is in a people oriented
business. He first takes care of his own employees,
fostering a caring, reciprocating environment. Aware of a
leader's tendency toward arrogance once reaching a powerful
position, Kelleher keeps his own hubris in check. Kelleher
saus he runs Southwest by simply taking a common sense
approach. Kelleher's basic rule is to take care of his
people and watch costs. He avoids the trap of basing
decisions on the fact that Southwest is a mnjor airline and
majors are supposed to do things certain ways.
B5
Significant is the fact that Southwest doesn't
participate in a major carrier's computer reservation
system, considered to be an essential marketing tool in the
airline industry. At first look, many would say that
Southwest is a low tech company and behind the times when it
comes to information technilogy. On the contrary after
closer examination, one realizes that instead of trying to
have the latest technology that every other airline has,
they simply look at their business applications and needs.
Once these requirements are defined, they then search the
market place for an IT product that will help them to
achieve these business purposes. They do not limit
themselves to just the latest technology. Older technology,
which some would consider to be obsolete, is simply another
resource to Southwest. Southwest uses the combination of
advertising, a conservative and less expensive CRS, and
having a travel agent use a telephone to connect the
customer to their organization. By using these available,
already in place assets, Southwest achieves their goal of
servicing their customers and simultaneously watches their
costs. These savings are subsequently passed on to the
consumer.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
In accordance with the problems encountered by the DoD
regarding the procurement, development and maintenance of
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Information Systems, the following recommendations are
suggested to improve the DoD's effectiveness and efficiency:
- Rmdundancy. Using one tupe of aircraft at SW indicates
that avoiding redundancU reduces costs. Similarly in
the DoD, it is recommended to search for similar IT
systems that have already been developed and adapt it
to your needs.
- Functionality. Southwest looks at business
applications that they want to automate, then theU
search for IT. As a DoD member, ensure that the
systems to be automated are current and functional.
Then search for an IT system that can enhance Uour
capabilities.
- Requirements. Southwest chose SAAS over SABRE because
of their business requirements. As a DoD member
developing a new system, "bells and whistles" can
increase your capability and flexibility In the future;
however, beware of those expensive enhancements that
don't contribute to your requirements.
- Available Resources. Southwest didn't limit themselves
to just the latest technologU, but instead viewed older
technology as a viable option to solve their IT needs.
As a DoD member, do not discount old technologU as
obsolete and unusable. Examine all resources.
For the past few years, the Department of Defense has
been trUing to improve general business practices, reduce
the development of redundant sUstems, and to reduce
spending. Through this case study on Southwest Airlines, we
have seen how general business practices and attitude toward






ADP Automatic Data Processing
AMF The stock market ticker tape symbol
for American Airlines (AA) and is
now its name, AMR Corporation.
AMRIS AMR Information System
APOLLO United Airline's CRS
ATC Air Traffic Controllers
ATM Automatic Ticket Machine
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CIM Corporate Information Management
CRS Computer Reservation System
D/FW Dallas/ Fort Worth Airport
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DoT Department of Transportation






KISS Keep It Simple Stupid
LAN Local Area Network
LUV Southwest's New York Stock Exchange
Symbol
OTS Off the shelf
PSA Pacific Southwest Airlines
SAAS SABRE Automated Airline System
SABRE Semi-Automated Business Resource
Environment. (AA's CRS)
SEC Security Exchange Commission
SJI San Jose International
SW Southwest
SWA Southwest Airlines
STIN SABRE Travel Information Network
SWIFT Southwest Integrated Flight Tracking
System
TAC Texas Aeronautics Commission
TOL Total Quality Leadership
UA United Airline
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THE ALI MCGRAW AIRLINE
When the Bloom Agency got the Southwest account, its
people decided that an airline is a woman and the ultimate
airline is Ali McGraw. Its "personality description model,"
a guideline for all Southwest marketing communications, read
as follows:
This young lady is young and vital. She is probably
somewhere between 20 and 25 years old and looks somewhat
younger, perhaps 18-20.
She is charming and goes through life with great flair and
exuberance. The first thing you notice about her is her
exciting smile, her friendly air, her wit.
In reality, she is quite efficient, and approaches all her
tasks with care and attention; however, because of her
dynamic personality, her efficiency is not obvious and is
generally taken for granted.
She is friendly and warm. Her hobbies are most likely
horseback riding, swimming, and metal sculpture.
(Joyce, 1972, p. 21)
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Southwest Airlines Co. (*Southwest" or the "Company*) is a major domestic airline which
provides single class air transportation characterized by frequent, high quality service at affordable prices.
Southwest primarily serves shorthaul city pairs, targeting the business commuter as well as leisure
travelers. The Company was incorporated in Texas and commenced Customer Service on June 18, 1971
with three Boeing 737 aircraft serving three Texas cities - Dallas, Houston and San Antonio. At yearend
1992, Southwest operated 141 Boeing 737 aircraft and provided service to 36 airports in 34 cities in the
midwestern, southwestern and western regions of the United States. Southwest is unique among the
major U.S. airlines in its operating and marketing strategies. Southwest focuses on point-to-point, rather
than hub-and-spoke, servc... in shorthaul markets with frequent, conveniently timed flights. For example,
the Company's average aircraft trip length in 1992 was approximately 378 miles with an average duration
of one hour. At yearend, the Company served 201 nonstop city pairs with an average weekday frequency
of seven roundtrips per city pair.
The business of the Company is somewhat seasonal. Quarterly operating income and, to a lesser
extent, revenues tend to be somewhat lower in the first quarter (January 1 - March 31).
The information contained in the sections indicated below from the Annual Report to Shareholders
for 1992 (the "Annuil Report") of Southwest Airlines Co. is incorporated herein by reference:
Annual Report
Section Title os
Letter to Shareholders .............................. 2-3
1992 Review ................................ .... 4-13
Quarterly Financial Data ....................... F16
Ten Year Summary ............................... FIg-FI9
Fuel
The cost of fuel is an item having significant impact on the Company's operating results. The






The Company is unable to predict the extent of future fuel cost changes. The Company has
standard industry arrangements with major fuel suppliers. Standard industry fuel contracts do not provide
material protection against price increases or for assured availability of supplies. Although market
conditions can significantly impact the price of jet fuel, at present, these conditions have not resulted in
an inadequate supply of jet fuel. For more discussion of current jet fuel costs and the impact of these
costs on the Company's operations, see Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations, set forth in the Annual Report.
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Regulation
Economic. The Dallas Love Field section of the International Air Transportation Competition
Act of 1979 ("Competition ActW), as it affects the Company's scheduled service, provides that no
common carrier may provide scheduled passenger air transportation for compensation between Love Field
and one or more points outside Texas, except that an air carrier may transport individuals by air on a
flight between Love Field and one or more points within the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma and Texas if (a) "such air carrier does not offer or provide any through service or ticketing
with another air carrier" and (b) "such air carrier does not offer for sale transportation to or from, and
the flight or aircraft does not serve, any point which is outside any such states." Southwest does not
interline or offer joint fares with any other air carrier. The Competition Act does not restrict the
Company's intrastate Texas flights or its air service from points other than Love Field to points beyond
Texas and the four adjacent states.
The Department of Transportation ("DOT") has significant regulatory jurisdiction over passenger
airlines. Unless exempted, no air carrier may furnish air transportation over any route without a DOT
certificate of authorization, which does not confer either exclusive or proprietary rights. The Company's
certificates are unlimited in duration and permit the Company to operate among any points within the
United States, its territories and possessions, except as limited by the Love Field section of the
Competition Act, as do the certificates of all other U.S. carriers. DOT may revoke such certificates, in
whole or in part, for intentional failure to comply with any provisions of subchapter IV of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, or any order, rule or regulation issued thereunder or any term, condition or
limitation of such certificate; provided that, with respect to revocation, the certificate holder has first been
advised of the alleged violation and has been given a reasonable time to effect compliance.
DOT prescribes uniform disclosure standards regarding terms and conditions of carriage, and
prescribes that terms incorporated into the Contract of Carriage by reference are not binding upon
passengers unless notice is given in accordance with its regulations.
Safety. The Company .is subject to the jurisdiction of the FAA with respect to its aircraft
maintenance and operations, including equipment, ground facilities, dispatch, communications, flight
training personnel and other matters affecting air safety. To insure compliance with its regulations, the
FAA requires airlines to obtain operating, airworthiness and other certificates which are subject to
suspension or revocation for cause. Southwest has obtained such certificates. The FAA, acting through
its own powers or through the appropriate United States Attorney, also has the power to bring
proceedings for the imposition and collection of fines for violation of the Federal Air Regulations.
The FAA has also implemented a number of new requirements which are being incorporated into
Southwest's maintenance program. These requirements relate to, among other things, inspection and
modification of aging aircraft, corrosion control, cargo compartment liners, traffic collision avoidance
and windshear. Based on its current implementation schedule, Southwest will be in compliance with the
new requirements within the required timeperiods. See "Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations," set forth in the Annual Report.
Environmental. The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 ("ANCA") requires the phase out
of Stage 2 airplanes (which meet less stringent noise emission standards than later model Stage 3
airplanes) in the contiguous 48 states by December 31, 1999. FAA rules establish interim compliance
dates for ANCA of December 31, 1994, December 31, 1996 and December 31, 1998. An operator may
comply by either implementing a reduction of the operator's base level of Stage 2 aircraft by at !east 25%
increments by the end of the three interim compliance dates or by operating a fleet that is at least 55%
Stage 3 by December 31, 1994, 65% by December 31, 1996, and 75% by December 31, 1998. Selection
of one of the two alternative compliance techniques is not irrevocable and operators are free to opt for
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one method at one compliance date and another at the next. Operation of Stage 2 aircraft after December
31, 1999 is prohibited, subject, however, to an extension of the final compliance date to December 31,
2003, if at least 85% of the aircraft used by the operator in the contiguous United States will comply with
Stage 3 noise levels.
The Company's fleet as of December 31, 1992 consisted of 49 Stage 2 aircraft and 92 Stage 3
aircraft, yielding a Stage 3 percentage of 65.25%. Accordingly, the Company already exceeds the Stage
3 fleet percentage requirement for the December 31, 1994 and December 31, 1996 interim compliance
dates.
As of December 31, 1992, of the 49 Stage 2 aircraft operated by the Company, 29 are leased
from third parties, and 20 are owned by the Company. The Company can comply with the rules by
acquiring additional Stage 3 aircraft and returning Stage 2 aircraft to the lessors as the leases terminate
according to their terms. Based upon the Company's current schedule for delivery of new Stage 3
airplanes, including options, the Company anticipates achieving an 85% Stage 3 fleet during calendar year
1999. Accordingly, in that event, Southwest would be entitled to maintain operation of at least 41 Stage
2 aircraft until December 31, 1999, or 2003 if the Company is successful in obtaining a waiver.
ANCA also requires the FAA to establish parameters within which any new Stage 2 and Stage
3 noise or access restrictions at individual airports must be developed. The published rules generally
provide that local noise restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft first effective after October 1990 require FAA
approval, and establish a regulatory notice and review process for local restrictions on Stage 2 aircraft
first proposed after October 1990. While the Company has had sufficient scheduling flexibility to
accommodate local noise restrictions imposed prior to October 1990, Southwest's operations could be
adversely affected if locally-imposed regulations become more restrictive or widespread.
Southwest is subject to various other federal, state and local laws and regulations relating to the
protection of the environment, including the discharge of materials into the environment.
Competition
The airline industry is highly competitive as to fares, frequent flyer benefits, routes and service,
and some carriers competing with the Company have greater financial resources, larger fleets and wider
name recognition. Some carriers competing with the Company have ownership interests in computer
reservation systems ("CRS") or participate in a CRS to an extent to which the Company does not. The
Company currently does not own an interest or significantly participate in any CRS. Profit lei.els in the
air transport industry are highly sensitive to changes in operating and capital costs and the extent to which
competitors match an airline's fares and services. The profitability of a carrier in the airline industry is
also impacted by general economic trends.
The Company is also subject to varying degrees of competition from surface transportation in its
shorthaul markets, particularly the private automobile. In shorthaul air services which compete with
surface transportation, price is a competitive factor, but frequency and convenience of scheduling,
facilities, transportation safety and Customer Service may be of equal or greater importance to many
passengers.
Insurance
The Company carries insurance of types customary in the airline industry and in amounts deemed
adequate to protect the Company and its property and to comply both with federal regulations and certain
of the Company's credit and lease agreements. The policies principally provide coverage for public and
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passenger liability, property damage, cargo and baggage liability, loss or damage to aircraft, engines and
spare parts and workers' compensation.
Frequent Flyer Awards
The Company's frequent flyer program, The Company Club, is based on trips flown rather than
mileage. The Company Club offers one free roundtrip travel award to any Southwest destination after
completing an application and flying 10 roundtrips (or 20 one-way trips) on Southwest within a
consecutive twelve-month period. ?,fter the initial application, the member must fly 8 roundtrips (or 16
one-way trips) within a twelve-month period to receive a free travel award certificate.
The trips flown as credit towards a free travel award certificate are valid for twelve months only;
the free travel award is automatically generated when earned by the Customer rather than allowing the
Customer to bank the trip credits indefinitely; and the free travel award is valid for one year only with
an automatic expiration date. Based on the issuance of free travel awards to qualified members, coupled
with the foregoing program cha-aiaeristics and the use of "black out" dates for the free travel awards
during peak holiday periods, the financial impact of free travel awards used on the Company's financial
statements was not material. Free travel awards redeemed were approximately 209,000, 207,000 and
168,000 during 1992, 1991 and 1990, respectively. The amount of free travel award usage as a
percentage of total Company revenue passengers carried was 1.5%, 1.8%, and 1.7% in 1992, 1991 and
1990, respectively.
The Company accounts for free travel awards using the incremental cost method, consistent with
the other major airlines. This method recognizes an average incremental cost to provide roundtrip
transportation to one additional passenger. The incremental cost to provide free transportation is accrued
at the time an award is earned and revenue is subsequently recognized, at the amount accrued, when the
free travel award is used. The estimated incremental costs include passenger costs such as beverage and
snack supplies, baggage claims, baggage handling and liability insurance; operations costs such as security
services, airport rentals, fuel, oil and into-plane charges; and reservations costs, such as communications
and system operations fees. The liability for free travel awards earned but not used at December 31,
1992 and 1991 was not material.
The number of free travel awards outstanding at December 31, 1992 and 1991 was approximately
174,000 and 139,000, respectively. These numbers do not include partially earned awards. The
Company currently does not have a system to accurately estimate partially earned awards. However,
these partially earned awards may equate to approximately 60-70% of the current outstanding awards.
Since the inception of The Company Club in 1987, approximately 16% of all award certificates have
expired without being used.
Employees
At December 31, 1992, Southwest had 11,397 employees, consisting of 3,358 flight, 596
maintenance, 6,133 ground Customer Service and 1,310 management, accounting, marketing and clerical
personnel.
Southwest has nine collective bargaining agreements covering approximately 83% of its
employees. Southwest's fleet service employees are subject to an agreement with the Ramp, Operations
and Provisioning Association which expires in December 1994. Customer Service and reservation
employees are subject to an agreement with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, which expires in February 1994. Flight attendants are subject to an agreement with
the Transportation Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, which expires May 31, 1996. The pilots are
subject to an agreement with the Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association (SWAPA), which expires in
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August 1994. Flight dispatchers are represented by the Southwest Airlines Employees Association, W
pursuant to an agreement which expires in November 1997. Mechanics and stock clerks are subject to
agreements with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, with both agreements expiring in August
1995. The flight simulator technicians are represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
pursuant to an agreement which expires in October 1995. The flight/ground school instructors are subject




The information contained under the sections indicated below from the Annual Report to
Shareholders tur 1992 is incorporated herein by reference:
Annual Report
Aircraft Fleet .................... 12
Ten Year Summary ................ FIB-F19
Southwest operated 141 Boeing 737 aircraft as of December 31, 1992. The Company has 54 and
13 aircraft under operating and capital leases, respectively. The remaining 74 aircraft are owned.
For information concerning aircraft subject to liens, see Note 5 to the Consolidated Financial
Statements.
For information regarding Southwest obligations under capital leases, noncancelable operating
leases and sale and leaseback transactions, see Notes, 5, 6 and 11 to the Consolidated Financial
Statements.
For information concerning Southwest's aircraft purchase commitments, see Note 3 to the
Consolidated Financial SLwtements. %
The Company has an agreement with CFM International, Inc. (a joint company of SNECMA
(France) and General Electric Company) dated May 28, 1981 for the supply of spare engines for its
Boeing 737-300 and -500 aircraft. CFM also supplies the engines to The Boeing Company for original
installation on such aircraft. CFM is the sole manufacturer of engines for use on the Boeing 737-300,
-400 and -500 aircraft.
Ground Facilities and Services
Southwest leases terminal passenger service facilities at each of the airports it serves to which it
has added various leasehold improvements. The Company leases land on a long-term basis for its
maintenance centers located at Dallas Love Field, Houston Hobby and Phoenix Sky Harbor, its training
center near Love Field which houses two 737 simulators, and its corporate headquarters also located near
Love Field. The maintenance, training center and corporate headquarters buildings on these sites were
built and are owned by Southwest. Southwest also operates six reservation centers. The reservation
centers located in Houston, Texas, Chicago, Illinois and Albuquerque, New Mexico occupy leased space.
The Company owns its Dallas, Texas, Phoenix, Arizona and San Antonio, Texas reservation centers.
The San Antonio reservation center is subject to liens securing long-term debt. See Note 5 to the
Consolidated Financial Statements for additional information.
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The Company performs substantially all maintenance on its aircraft and provides ground support
services at most of the airports it serves. However, the Company has arrangements with certain aircraft
maintenance firms for major component overhauls and repairs for its aircratt and engines, which
comprises the majority of the annual maintenance cost.
Item 3. Legal Prcee&'s$
None to be reported.
item 4. Submission of'fMaters so a Vote of Setcw4 HoMders
None to be reported.
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EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF THE REGISTRANT
The executive officers of Southwest, their positions and their respective ages (as of March I,
1993) are as follows:
Officer
SMpsto Since
Herbert D. Kelleher Chairman of the Board, President, 61 1967
and Chief Executive Officer
Colleen C. Barrett Executive Vice President-Customers 48 1978
and Corporate Secretary
Gary A. Barron Executive Vice President, 48 1978
Chief Operations Officer
John G. Denison Executive Vice President- 48 1986
Corporate Services
Gary C. Kelly Vice President-Finance, 37 1986
Chief Financial Officer
James F. Parker Vice President-General Counsel 46 1986
Ron Ricks Vice President-Governmental Affairs 43 1986
James C. Wimberly Vice Preident-Ground Operations 40 1985
Executive officers ;re elected annually at the first meeting of Southwest's Board of Directors
following the annual meeting of shareholders or appointed by the President pursuant to Board
authorization.
Herbert D. Kelleher has been Chairman of the Board, President, and Chief Executive Officer of
Southwest for more than five years. Mr. Kelleher also serves on the Executive Committee of the Board
of Southwest.
On November 21, 1990, Ms. Colleen C. Barrett was appointed Executive Vice President -
Customers. Ms. Barrett had served as Vice President - Administration since July 1985, and Corporate
Secretary of Southwest since March 28, 1978.
On June 5, 1989, Mr. Gary A. Barron was appointed Executive Vice President, Chief Operations
Officer of Southwest. Mr. Barron had served as Executive Vice President - Corporate Services, Vice
President - General Counsel, Vice President - Inflight Service, Vice President - Corporate Services and
Vice President - Special Projects since joining Southwest in 1978.
On June 5, 1989, Mr. John G. Denison was appointed Executive Vice President - Corporate
Services of Southwest. Mr. Denison had served as Vice President - Finance, Chief Financial Officer




SCHEDULE V - PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT
year. eaded December 31,1990, 1991 and 1992
(In thouman)
Balance at I6hsae at
m~aiimg Additim Ratreemb end *f
Flight equipumnt S1,255,076 $155.548 $154,356 $113,056 $1,369,324
Ground property and equipment 164.362 42.455 4.125 (8.574) 194.118
Deposits o0 flight equipmmt
purchase contracts 1371956 -1 (10442) 153.201•11 55 7.3• S3 7 3 S158, 48 - S L W6. 43
Flight equipment $1,369,324 $177,915 $111,592 $ 115,872 $1,551,519
Ground property and equipment 194,118 35,211 165 (10,642) 218,522
Deposits on flight equipment
purchme contracts 153a201 1 -9 (1052 - .JQ -L-S1,76,643 $38,8 -.-75 SS1.952,973
Flight equipment $1,551,519 $260,464 $142,601 S 133,614 $1,802,996
Ground property and equipment 218,522 73,087 15 (3,671) 287,923
Deposits on flight equipment
p0Arhm contractst ,.182.932 159291 - (1292.,93 212.904
Balance before cumulative
effect of change in
accounting principle 1,952,973 493,466 142,616 - 2,303,823
Cumulative effect of change in
accounting principle - -- - 3952!





SCHEDULE VI - ALLOWANCE FOR DEPRECIATION
Yesrs ended December 31, 1990, 1991 and 1992(In thousands)
Balnce at Additiss Balance at
begianing chargd t Retiremset end of
of mr rn &ad sae Ohff year
Flight equipment $303,417 $65,848 $24,796 $344.469
Ground property and equipment 49.7A 0 13.I81 1,6 616
S353.137 S7942 S.60 L -06
Flight equipment $344.469 $70,155 $33,493 $381.131
Ground property and equipment 61,637 16g7 36 77.648
Flight equipment $381,131 S89.375 $24,987 $1,659 $447,178
Ground property and equipment 77.648 18.743 6 96.385
Balance before cumulative
effect of change in
accounting principle 458,779 108,118 24,993 1,659 543.563
Cumulative effect of change in





SCHEDULE X - SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME STATEMENT INFORMATION
(In thousands)
Ymw eded December 31.
1992 3991 1990
Advertising.................................S37.174 $32,971 2,9
A valoremm e........................... S20.232 S16-788 S13746
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APPENDIX E
SSOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. I
m aeme 's Discussion and Analysis The increase in passenger revenues, whicd accounted for 96.-1
F'innclai Condition and percent of tota operating revenues resutled from a 22.1 percent
Iesults of Operations Increase in revenue passenger miles (RPMs) in 1992 and a 5.0
percent increase in revenue passenger yield per RPM.
Usso 1992,TIONS m tg The increase in RPMs o( 22.1 percent in 1992 exceeded thedie recess in the airlne industry contisoer inaa 1992p resitio Increase in ASMs of 15.6 percent for the me period and resultedin three ofithe most inanciay devasating•yew m the history of in an increase in the load factor from 61.1 percent to 64.5 percentdI
the airlines. The industry changed its overall financial position The 1992 ASM increase resulted from the addition otf 17 aircraft.from a cumulative industry profit to an overall industry loss which were primarily used to expand Caljora, Las Vegas,
during this three year period. Domestic competition was charac- Phoenix, and Chicago markets.
serized by heated fare wars n 1992. which exacerbated industry
losses. H•wever, despite these ad6'erse industr, conditions, Freight revenues increased in 1992 to $33.1 million from $26.--
Southwest reported a profit for its 20th consecuti, year. million in 1991. The 25.2 percent increase in freight revenues
exceeded the 15.6 percent ASM increase for the same period
The Companys low operating costs and shorthaui doware priarily due to further expansion of United States mail services
market niche have allowed the Company to profit during this and increased feight marketing programs. Other revenues
period. Southwest has continued to maintain steady growth in its increased 46.6 percent primarily as a result of charter revenues.
mature markets, such as Texas, and to expand in markets where Charter revenues increased 91.9 percent due to a significant
other carriers are reducing service. In 1992, Southwest became increase in commercial charters.
the largest carrier o( intrastate passengers in California and also
number one in originating passengers in Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Operating Expenses Consoliated operating expenses increased
Kansas City. The Company's expansion efforts at Chicago Midway 20.1 percent to $1,502.5 million from $1,250.7 million in 1991
airport were successful in 1992. Southwest added service to The primary factors contributing to the increase were the 15.6
Indianapolis and opened two new cities in the midwest, Cleveland percent increase in ASMs resulting from the addition of seventeen
and Columbus, Ohio, each with nonstop service to Midway and 737 aircraft; increased contributions to profit sharing and
St louis. A reservation center and pilot domicile weft also employe savings plans; higher agency commissions; higher
opened in 1992 at Chicago Midway. In May 1993, the Company aircraft rentals;..and increased maintenance costs. On a per-ASM
will begin service to Louisville, Kentucky with nonstop flights basis, operating expenses increased 4.0 percent in 1992 asto St. Louis, Chicago and Birmingham. In February 1993, the follows:
Company began tain calls at the Company's new reservation
center in Albuquerque. -Operating expenses per ASM
Increase PercentDuring 1993, the Company planto coninue expanding its shon- 1992 1991 (decrease) chang
haul markets, particularly through added service to existing city-
pir markets in Calforna and the western region of its system. In Salaries, wages and benefits 2.174 2.12c .Oic 2.4%
addition, the Company will continue its focus on controlling costs Profit sharing and employee
savings plans .18 .09 .09 1000
and maintaining high quality Customer Service to protect its Fuel and oi h.14 I.22 (.08) (6.6)
financial and competitive position within the industry Maintenance materials and
repairs 56 53 03 i.-
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Agency commissions .50 .-H .06 13.6Aircraft rentals .30 .26 .0-1 15.-1
19q2 COMPARED \X1TH 1991 The Company's consolidated net Liadling fees and other
income for the year 1992 was $91.0 million (1.97 per share), rentals .48 .-H .0-1 9.1
before the cumulative effect of a change in accounting principle, Depreciation .47 .A_ - -
compared to $26.9 million ($.31 per share) for 1991, an increase Other 1.23 1.19 0-1 3.
of 238.1 percent. The 1991 earnings per share has been restated TOWaJ 7.03' 6.'6c .2c -. 0%
for the 1992 two-for-one stock split (see Note 8 to the Consol-
idated Financial Statements). The increase in earnings was
attributable to an increase in operating income of 190.2 percent. The increase in salaries, wages and benefits per ASM in 1992 of 2.4
percent resulted from a 16.1 percent increase in employeeOperating Revenues Operating revenues increased by 28.3 benefits perASM. Salaries and wages perASM remained constat.
percent in 1992 to $1,685.2 million. Operating revenue per The increase in employee benefits per ASM resulted from
available seat mile (ASM) increased in 1992 to $.0789 from increases in workers' compensation and health benefit costs.
$.0710 in 1991. Operating revenues increased as follows: a 28.1 Although the Company has implemented, and plans to continue
percent increase in passenger revenues: a 25.2 percent increase implementing, various cost savings programs to attempt to
in freight revenues: and a ,6.6 percent increase in other revenues, control the annual increase in these benefit costs, these costs are
expected to continue to increase in the near term. Headcount
increased 16.6 percent in 1992, slightly more than the 15.6
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percent increase in ASMs. However, employee productivity The increase in landing fees and other rentals per ASM of 9.1
improvdfrom 2,451 passengers handled per employee in 1991 to percent resulted from an increase of 12.1 percent in landing Lees
2.597 in 1992. Average salary and benefit costs per employ" per ASM, or .03d, and a 2.1 percent increase in other rentals per
increased 3.7 percent from 1991 to 1992. ASM, or .01 . The increase in landing fees per ASM is pnarih
In January 1992, the Company signed a new ollective -alpinin attributable to overall rate increases, with significant increases in
wnity the C s igned a onew c ol v ebrgcaiNew Orleans and Chicago. The increase in odter rentals per ASM is
•,m•withthe 1 •nprtto Workers Union of Arner•ca als prnu . du tat innrae.
cteresents the Company's flight attendants The contract
extends into 1996. Depreciation expense per ASM remained constant in 1992.
However, had the Company not changed the estimated remainingProfit sharing and employee savings plan expenses per ASM useful lives of its 737-200 aircraft as discussed in Note 2 to the
doubled in 1992. This significant increase was primarily the result Consobdated Financial Sttements, depreciation expense per
ofa significandy more profitable yea. For additional information, ASM would have increased +.3 percent, or $.02 per ASM in 1992.
see Note 10 to the Consolidated Financial Statements. The increase is primarily the result of acquiring more aircraft and
Fuel and oil expenses perASM decreased 6.6 percent in 1992 due certain leasehold interests as described in Note" to the Consol-
to a 7.4 percent reduction in the average jet fuel cost per gdllon lated Financial Statements.
from 1991. The o erage priceAofbWt fueldecreased fromd65.69 in Other operating expenses per ASM increased 3.-4 percent pri-
1991 to 60.82u in 199e. A combination of a relatively mild winter marly due -a increases in ad valorem tax rates and passenger-
and unusually high inventories at the end of 1991 precipitated a related costs. Passenger-related costs increased per ASM due to
rapid decline ofj fuel prim beginning late fourth quarter 1991, the 22.8 percent increase in passengers carried. which exceeded
which resulted in an average of 54.96( per gallon in first quarter ASM capacity growth for 1992.
992. Jet fuel prices rose in second quarter 1992 to an average of
60.68' per gallon as a result ofunusually cold weather late in the Other "Other expenses (income)" included interest expense,
season, a global firming of supply-demand fundamentals, and a interest income and nonoperating gains and losses. Interest
recognition that the Iraq-UN situation would not produce imme- expense, net of capitalized interest, increased 52.2 percent in
diate oil exports. Jet fuel prices remained relatively steady 1992 due to 1991-92 issuances of $0 million in senior
throughout the remainder of 1992 with an average of 64.46( and unsecured aotes. See Note 5 to the Consolidated Financial
62.44c per gallon in third and fourth quarter 1992, respectively. Statements for further information. Interest income decreased
$287,000 in 1992 due to lower interest rates offset by higher
Maintenance materials and repairs per ASM increased 5.7 investmentbalances. Net nonoperating losses consisted primaril
percent in 1992. This increase was primarily the result of of payments related to deficiency guarantees as discussed in
performing more airframe and engine overhaui work in 1992. Note 7 to the Consolidated Financial Statements.
The Company performed 13'scheduled airframe overhauls in Income Taves The provision for income taxes decreased in 1992,
1992, as compared to three in 1991, as a result of the recent as a percentage of income before income taxes and cumulative
modification of its airframe overhaul maintenance program with effect of change in accounting principle, to 38.0 percent from
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and growth of the 38.6 percent in 1991. The decrease was primarily the result of a
Company's fleet. In addition, the Company changed its method of reduction in state income taxes versus previous estimates. See
accounting for scheduled airframe overhaul costs from the direct Note 12 to the Consolidated Financial Statements for further
expense method to that of capitalizing and amortizing the costs information.
over the periods benefited. See Note 2 to the Consolidated
Financial Statements for further information. Airfame overhauls 1991 COMPAR.ED ITH 1990 The Company' consoliaed net
were also more costly in 1992 as compared to 1991. Consequently, income for the year 1991 was $26.9 million, or $31 per share.
amortization of 1992 capitalized airframe overhauls, along with compared to S-7.1 million, or $55 per share, for 1990. a
amortization of the cumulative adjustment related to the account- decrease of 42.8 percent. The decrease in earnings primarily Was
ingchange, exceeded overhauls directly expensed in 1991. Engine attributable to: 1) a decrease in operating income o023.1 percent:
overhauls were also more expensive in 1992 due to the higher cost 2) a $7.3 million increase in net interest expense; and 3) a $4.6
torepair737-300and-500high- b'passengines, which represent million decrease in nonoperating gains, before the effects of
an increasing percentage of the fleet. income taxes.
Agency commissions per ASM increased 13.6 percent in 1992 Operating Re! enues Operating revenues increased by 10."
primarily due to passenger revenue growth exceeding ASM percent in 1991 to $1,313.6 million. Passenger revenues, which
growth coupled with a higher mix of travel agency sales. accounted for %.5 percent of total operating revenues, increased
10.8 percent to S1.267.9 million while freight revenues increased
Aircraft rentals per ASM increased 15.4 percent in 1992. The 19.1 percentto S26.4 million and other revenues declined by -13
increase was the result of the Company leasing four used 737-300 percent to $1..3 million.
aircraft in 1992 under long-term operating leases, along with
incurring a full year's rent on the 1W4 aircraft acquired, or
converted to operating leases, in 1991 through various leasing
arrangements. On December 31,1992, the Company completed
the financing throough saleAeasebacks of four 737-300 aircraft
delivered in 1992: however, no rent expense will be recorded on
these leases until 1993.
"104
revenue growth was negatively impacted in 1991 by the Profi' charing and employee savings plan expenses on a per-ASM
wr tPsianGulfand thedomestic economic recession. As a basis decreased 18.2 percent in 1991. The decrease was a result of
rsult, operating revenue per ASM declined in 1991 to $.0710 from decreased profitability offset by increased employee eligibility
1990's S.0723. or 1.8 percent The 1991 passenger revenue an tingprtdpationinthee mployee smin splanmatdiin
increase was attributable to a 14.3 percent increase in revenue contributions program. For additional information, see Note 10 to
passengers carried, which resulted from aggressive discount and the Consolidated Financial Statements.
prmotional prsrams to stimulate an otherwise weak domestic Fuel and oil expenses per ASM decreased 17.0 percent in 1991 asoe market. However, the promotional programs that were the jet fuel average cost per gallon decreased 15.7 percent to
success in stimulating traffic caused passenger revenue yield t.e i1t f rom p 7. llon Dereae 19.7 prcent$112 frm .9In 990,or .3 ercnt. 65.69' in 1001 fro  77.89' in 1990. During 1990, crude oil
per RPM to decline to $32prices and, therefore, et fuel prices, were very volatile as a result
The increase in RPMs was 13.4 percent in 1991 as compared to ofthe invasion of Kuwait and resulting war in the Persian Gulf.Jet
1990 versus a 12." percent increase in ASMs for the same period, fLel prices declined to pre-invasion levels by second quarter 1991.
resulting in an increase in the loadfactor from 60.7 percentto61.1 In addition, fuel conservation measures implemented following
percent. The 1991 ASM increase primarily resulted from the the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were continued throughout 1991
addition of 18 aircraft that were used primarily to initiate service reducing fuel burn approximately 4.0 percent from 1990 pre-
in Sacramento. California to Ontario, Burbank, and San Diego, invasion levels. As a result of declining production rates in the
California; expand service in Oakland, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and former Soviet Union, coupled t.0h overall supply concerns, jet
Las Vegas, and initiate service between Kansas City/St. Louis and fuel prices escalated in third avl fourth quarters 1991. In late
between Los Angeles/Las Vegas. fourth quarter 1991, as a consequence of continued high OPEC
ethird quarter 1991, traffic demandbegan to improveas production and a relatively mild winter, the supply concerns
Duringe the precedig dmo n d of 1 oniderove a- disappeared based on high inventories of crude oil and refined
comparedproducts, thus precipitating a rapid & e in jet fuel costs.
sonality. As a result, RPM yields began to improve as compared to
earlier 1991 results and load factors were up as compared to the Maintenance materials and repairs per ASM increased 3.9
corresponding month of the prior year for the period September percent in 1991. This increase was primarily a result of the higher
through December 1991. Revenues per ASM increased in fourth costofengineoverhauls forthe moreexpensive 737-300and -500
quarter 1991 versus fourth quarter 1990, the first such favorable high-bypass engines.
quarterly comparison In 1991. The Company believes it benefitedfrom slightly unproved economic conditions in its mars Aircraft rentals increased 62.5 percent in 1991 as a result of thesuccessful expansion Into new California markets: and service 1991 salefleaseback financing of three new aircraft with long-reductions from competitors in itsCalifornia, Phoenix, Lasevgas, term operating leases and five older aircraft with short-term
are ucicago rmarkets. operating leases. In addition, in 1991 the Company leased three
used 737-300 aircraft under long-term operatingleases and three
Freight revenues increased 19.1 percent in 1991 to $26.4 million used 737-200 aircraft under short-term operating leases.
from $22.2 million in 1990. Freight revenues grew 83.1 percent
from 1989 to 1991, more than double the rate of ASM growth over Landing fees and other rentals increased on a per-ASM basis by
th* same period. This growth primarily resulted from expanded 18.9 percent in 1991 as a result of rate increases and expanded
United States mail services and increased cargo marketing efforts teraminal fecxpenes Pincrapl d Phrimxkari boly dureAsrr Other
Other revenues decreased 4.3 percent primarily due to a 20.7 operating expenses increased primarily due to increases in
percent decrease in charter revenues resulting from a decline in advertising and promotional expenses to stimulate traffic and
military activities requiring domestic charters. increases inad valorem tax rates.
Oiperating EipensesConsolidated operating expenses increased Otber " Other expenses (income)" included interest expense.
13.2 percent to SI.250.7 million from $1,104.9 million in 1990. interest income and nonoperating gains and losses. Interest
The primary factors contributing to the increase were the 12.7 expense, net of capitalized interest, increased 56.8 percent in
percent increase in ASMs resulting from the addition of eighteen 1991 due to issuances of $300 million in senior unsecured notes.
737 aircraft and increases in aircraft rentals, terminal rentals, See Note 5 to the Consolidated Financial Statements for further
and landing fees. These increases were offset by a large decrease information. Interest income increased $3.0 million in 1991 due
in jet fuel costs. The net result was an increase in operating to higher investment balances, offset by lower interest rates. Net
exp s ASM of only . percent over 1990 levels. nonoperating gains declined $,4.6 million in 1991, as more fulyv
expenses per odescribed in Note 11 to the Consolidated Financial Statements.
Salaries, wages and benefits per ASM increased 2.. percent in IncomeTa.resAsapercentageofincomebeforeincometaxes. the
1991 .,_ting from a 1.8 percent increase in salaries and wages
per ASM and a -.- percent increase in employee benefits per ASM. provision for income taxes increased in 1991 to 38.6 percent from
Headcount increased 13.-t percent in 1991. slightly more than the 37.0 percent in 1990. The increase primarily resulted from
12.7 percent increase in ASMs. Despite this increase in head- increases in estimated state income tax rates. See Note 12 to the
count, employee productivity increased from 2,393 passengers Consolidated Financial Statements for further information.
handled per employee in 1990 to 2.451 in 1991. Average salary
and benefit costs per employee increased 3.2 percent from
1990 to 1991.
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U"QDtl AND CAPITAL RESOURC. S The Company has various options available to meet its capital and
Cash provided from operations s $264.5 million in 1992 as operating commitments, including cash on hand at December 31,compared to $103.2 million in 1991. During 1992, additional "1992 of411.0milion, internallygenerated funds and a revolving
comparod $103.2 miio wereigenerated f99 om Dur Septe r 1992, credit h a group of banks of up to $250 million (none of
indss d $961. million were senerauendfrm the September 1992 which had been drawn at December 31, 1992). In addition, theissuance of $100 million in senior unsecured 7 't% notes due in Cmaywi locnie aosbroigo esn pin
2007 (see Note 5 to the Cnsolidated Financial Statements for Companywil also consider various borrowing or lasingoptions
additional information). in addition, $120.0 million was gener. to maximize earnings and cash flows.
ated from the sale and leaseback of four new 737.300 aircraft During 1991, cash generated from operations was $103.2 million.
subject to long-term operating leases (increasing total commit- Additional fundsof $296.4 million were generated from issuances
ments for operating leases by $245,0 million). The Company also of a total of $300 million in senior unsecured notes. In addition.
received net proceeds of $869 million from the sale of 2,500,000 $132.4 million was generated from the sale and leaseback of eight
pre-splt shares ofits common stock in a public offering (see Note aircraft: three were new 737-500 aircraft subject to long-term
8 to the Consolidated Financial Statements). These proceeds were operating leases and five were older 737-200 aircraft subject to
primarily used to finance aircraft-related capital expenditures short-term operating leases (increasing total commitments for
and provide working capital. operating leases by $218.8 million). These proceeds were prn-
During 1992, capital expenditures of $409.2 million were p marnly used to finance aircraft-related capital expenditures,
marly for the purchase of six new 7' 7-.300 aircraft and seven new provide working capital, and retire kong-term debt.
737-500 aircraft delivered during the year along with progress During 1990, cash generated from operations was $111.9 millhi.
payments for future aircraft deliveries. At December 31. 1992, Additional funds of $200.0 million were generated through the
capital commitments for the Company consisted primarily of sale and leaseback of 10 aircraft: six were new 737-500 aircraft
scheduled aircraft acquisitions. At yearend, Southwest had sixty subject to long-term operating leases with four older 737-200
737s on firm order with options to purchase another fifty-three aircraft subject to short-term operating leases (increasing total
737s.Aggregatefundingrequiredforthesecommitmentsapprox- commitments for operating leases by $381.1 million). These
imated $1,497.1 million at December 31,1992. See Note 3 to the proceeds were primarily used to finance aircraft-related capital
Consolidated Financial Statements for further information, expenditures, provide working capital, retire long-term debt, and
As of December 31, 1992, the Company had 2,500,000 shares purchase treasury stock.
available from a 1990 authorization by its Board of Directors to
purchase shares of its common stock froom time to time on the
open market. No shares have been purchased since 1990.
See Note 5 to the Cotnsolidated Fmancial Statements regarding the
1992 conversion of the outstading 63/4% convertible subor-
dinated Debentures issued bySouthwestAirlines Eurofinance N.V.
into Southwest's common stock.
During 1992, the Company satisfied certain "deficiency guaran-
tees:' See Note 7 to the Consolidated Financial Statements for
further information.
Injanuary 1993, the Company's Board of Directors approved the
early redemption, effective March 1 1993, of $100 million 9%
senior unsecured Notes due 1996. See Note 5 to the Consolidated
Financial Statements for further discussion.
The Company will adopt Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 109, "Accounting for Income Taxes;' and Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106, "Accounting for
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions;' in first quarter
1993. See Note I to the Consolidated Financial Statements for
additional information.
The Clinton Administration has proposed certain deficit reduc-
tion measures. These measures, a,,ng other things, presently
include an increase in the Feder.l cot yo. ate income tax rate and a
broad-based energy tax. If put into law, these measures would
increase the Company's costs and. potentially, reduce its net
earnings to the extent that the increased taxes cannot be
recovered through increased revenues. Management cannot
predict the ultimate outcome of any changes in taxes.
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Cash and cash equivalents $ 411.036 S 200.8%'
Accounts receivable 51,787 -0"
Inventories of parts and supplies, at cost 30.758 23,030
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 12,505 8.N)2
Total current assets 506,086 310.00 1
Property and equipment at cost (Notes 3, 5 and 6):
Flight equipment 1,842,517 I.5•I.SI)
Ground property and equipment 287,923 21832.52
Deposits on flight equipment purchase contracts 212,904 182.932
2,343,344 1.952.9-3
Less allnowace for depreciation 559,052 -458.-•9
1,784,292 1.49+.1-4
Other assets 2,599 30.o,)6
$2,292,977 S183-.291
Liabilities and Stockholders' Equit.
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable $ 78,358 S 5-0,-0
Accrued liabilities (Note 4) 216,648 B50,8"0
Air traf liability 55,850 -2.069
Income taxes payable 6,744 3-
Current maturities of long-term debt 10,760 6.383
Total current liabilities 368,360 25+.869
Long-term debt less current maturities (Note 5) 699,123 61-.016
Deferred income taxes 133,430 105.5"
Deferred gains from sale and leaseback of aircraft 224,645 222.818
Other deferred liabilities 13,166 8310
Commitments and contingencies (Notes 3. 6 and 7)
Stockholders' equity (Notes 8 and 9):
Common stock, $1.00 par value: 200.000,000 shares authorized:
92,472. 755 shares issued in 1992 and 42,437,922 shares in 1991 92,473 12.-38
Capital in excess of par value 155,938 8 1.08-
Retained earnings 605,928 ,O.259
854,339 (31.68-
Less treasury stock, at cost (2,90-4 shares in 1992;
217,732 shares in 1991) 86 3, I_-_




SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. 1"
coaoudmNd Stutenmo Income
ton &%tkh~IJ e~cqx pi'r %WrrMn'wb
Years ended December 31.
1992 I•OK) Il
OperaUing revenues:
PsStp•r $1,623.828 .l.26-.89)- SI.1-14.421
Freight 33.088 26.-128 22.100
Other 28,262 1.280 2M. 142
Total operating revenues 1,685,178 1-21 3 1.1867. -
Operating expenses:
Salaries, wages and benefits (Note 10) __ 501.870 40o.,l 3 i ." ,;-
Fuel and oil 2-6,543 22i.403 2-42.(1
Maintenance materials and reptirs 120,578 9"3€)8 8.8r-
Agency commissions 106,372 81.245 "2.084
Aircraft rentals 64,169 -19.1-1 26.08i
Landing fees and other rentals 102,717 83.1-- 61.1I"
Depreciation 101,188 86.202 "9.429
Other operating expenses 262.105 219.8i2 183,8-0
Total operating expenses 1,502,542 1.250.669 1. 10+880
Operating income 182,636 62.936 81.8-9
Other expenses (income):
Interest expense -58,941 43.939 32.001
Capitalized interest (15,350) 15.301) (13.-38)
Interest income (10,344) (10,631) (-595)
Nonoperatlng losses (pins), net (Note 11) 2,552 1,089 (3.3-2)
Total other expenses 35,799 19.096 -.116
Income before income taxes and cumulative effect of change
in accounting principle ! 46,837 43.8-*0 +.i3
Provision for income taxes (Note 12) 55,816 16.921 2".6-0
Income before cumulative effect of change in accounting principle 91,021 26.919 4".081
Cumulative effect of change in accounting principle (Note 2). 12,538 - -
Net income $ 103,559 S 26.919 i -1 -.083
Per share amounts (Notes 2.8 and 13):
Income before cumulative effect of change in accounting principle $ .97 S .31 5 .i
Cumulative effect of change in accounting principle .13 - -
Net income $ 1.10 S .31 " .v'
Pro forma amounts assuming the new method is applied retroactively:
Net income $ 91,021 S 2.109 S 4 338




Cons@0idmtd Statmwrit of Stockholders' Equity
Three Years ended December 31, 1992
tin lhuuand. ow,•*t per quni Aukf,)
Capital in
Common excess of Retained Treasun
stock par value earnings stock ToW
Balance at December 31.1 4SO $32.2i-4 S I -i.I t) S"I St61J') SW.3tR
Three-for-rao stock split 01olet ) 1- A.133 (It.1 3i) -- (2)
Purchase o4f .r99sUr stock - - - (.), (2.•, .5.0)Retirement oflir-,su% shtock (\ote 8) 13 ).4%) (NQ.'Sil • 83._8 -
Issuance o[ common stock upo~n exercise of
executive stock ozptions ( \ote q) 121 19 " (80 i 129
Cash dividends. $.0,83i per share - - 0. I1 l,) - (- I S)
Net income- 1990 
- - 4'.08i - 4-.083
Balance at December 31. 14% -42.412 81.11- 484.i-59 t33o-) 60..851
Issuance of common and treat.u, stock upon
exercise of executive stock options and
pursuant to emploee stock option and
purchase plans (Ntne 9) 26 i-O - -40-1 90
Cash dividends. S.Oi per share 
- - (.4.219) - (N.219)
Net income- 1991 
- - 26.010 - 26.91)
Balance at December 31. 10 '),L) -.2.138 81.98 ,0.250 (3.1031 628.321
Public common stock offering (Note 8) __ 2,328 82,094 - 2,524 86,946
Conversion of debentures (Note 5) 1,371 3.0,678 - - 36,0i9
Two-for-one stock split (Note 8) 46,180 (46.180) - - -
Issuance of common and treasury stock upon
exercise of executive stock options and
pursuant to emplo'ee stock option and
purchase plans (Note 9) 156 3,359 - 553 4,068
Cash dividends. $.053 per share (4,890) (4,890)
Net income- 1992 
- - 103.559 - 103,559




Consloadttd Statement of Cash F vs
Years ended December 31,
1992 I) II
Cash fIows from operating actni'ti s.
Net income S 103,559 S 2;0.914 S -".083
Cumulative effAct of change in accounting principle (Note 2) (12.538) - -
Income before cumulative effect of change in accounting principle 91,021 20.41o)
Adjustmens to reconcile net income to cash provided by
operating actmties:
Depreciation 101,188 80.202
Deferred income taxes 21,260 (3. 16) Mt. 2•1)
Amortization of deferred gains on sale and leaseback of aircraftl • (32.719) (31.-184) (21.02.)
Amortization of scheduled airframe overhauls (Note 2) 6,930 - -
Gains from sale and leaseback of aircraft (Note !1) - tii-i) ('.6-i)
Changes in certain assets and liabilities:
Increase in accounts receivable (4,280) (3.020) (6.936)
Increase in other current assets (11,325) (6.20i) (6.8-0)
Increase in accounts payable and accrued liabilities 65,706 38.9-2 201.66
Increase in air traffic liability 13,781 330" 5.024
.Increase (decrease) in other current liabilities 6,881 (9.339) 5.-26
Other 6,092 1.240 (393)
Net cash provided by operating activities .264,535 103.222 I 1-.935
Cash lows from investing activities:
Purchases of property and equipment (409,154) (341.12") (31".-30)
Proceeds from sales of other property and equipment 251 9- 2.464
Net cash use4 in investing activities (408,903) (351.030) (31i.266)
Cash flows from financing activties:
Issuance of long-term debt 98,510 290.3-8 -
Proceeds from pubkc common stock offering (Note 8) 86,946 - -
Proceeds from aircraft sale and leaseback transactions 120,000 132.3%0 200..(XK)
Proceeds from note receivable - - 4.200o
Purchase of treasury stock (86) - (2.i30)
Payment of long-term debt and capital lease obligations (9.449) (1 3.36 'i4 29.832)
Payment of cash dividends (4,890) (+-. 219) (.I.1 i)
Proceeds from employee stock plans 3,517 9-0 -
Other - (68S) 1219)
Net cash provided by financing activities 29,,5048 411.1 i' 144.4-4
Net increase (decrea.'e) in cash and c-,h equuialens 150,180 1-3.349 (58.85-)
Cash and cash equihalents at beginning of period 260,856 8.50- 146-.364
Cash and cash equialents at end ot period $ 411,036 S 210.8% S 8-30O
Cash pa.yments for:
Interest, net of amount capitalized $ 39,395 S l(.96; 5 V) 342






SM C OSOUDATED FINANCAL DATA
tin ustanJ' .Xcrr'it per urtf" Jnmaunb) 1992 1991 1ow 148()
Operating revenues:
Passenger S 1,623,828 S 1.2(0.80) S l.l-s.-2l S 4'i.%8
Freight 33.088 20.-l,8 22.1% 18.-"
Other 28,262 19..11 20.1! 22 22"13
Total operating revenues 1,685,178 I.31.3.(Co, 1.180."il) 1,015.052
Operating expenses 1.502,542 I.25o.b4,s 1.104,&+;0 _ .41.120
operating income 182,636 02.030 81.8"4 9-.620
Other expense (income), net 35.799 19.0.(1 ".120'- (13.35%)
Income before income taxes 146.837 43.8-40 -4,-i3 110.982
Prvovisi for inemc,.ne taxes . 55,816 10.421 2.6-."0 39.12-
Net income $ 91.021"' S 26.19 S S.083 -1.558
Net income per common and common equialent share_9 $.97 S, , S."9
Cash dividends per common share $05300 (),(MWO S oi83i $ 04065
Total assets $ 2,292,977 S 1.83".291 1.-1-4.138 S 1.415.090
long-term debt $ 699,123 S 61.061 S 326.9% S 3$k5-sI4
Stockholders' equity $ 854,253 S b28.,2i S 6S -.851 $ 58".316
CONSOLIDATED FlIANCIAL RATIOS
Return on average total assets 4..4%4%) 1.6% 3.3% 5.2%
Return on average stockholders' equity 11.7%1" +-.4% -9% 12..4%
Debt as a percentage of invested capital ,5.0% 4. -9.50o 35.1% 3".6%
CONSOLIDATED OPERATING STATISTICS
Revenue passengers carried 27,839,284 22.069.912 19830.9841 i'.qI,8.263
RPMs (000s) 13."87,005 I 112%.183 9.9i8.940 9.281.992
ASMs (000s) 21.366.642 18.,01.003 lb.401.115 i 4.76.'32
Load factor 6-.5% 11 % 6070% 62.7%
Avera length of passenger haul 495 -sI' 502 51-
Trips flown 438,184 382.--2 338.108 30-..6-3
Average passenger fare S58.33 5,55.; S5i-.1 $54.21
Passenger revenue ield per RPM 1.78' II.22' IIA... 10.49C
Operating revenue yield per ASM 7.89W - 10c -.23c 6.80c
Operating expenses per ASM 7.03' 0. 67 b.-c 0.20c
Fuel cost per gallon (average). 60.82t 65 (9 -8,.4,C
Number of emplo•ees at yearend 11.397 97-8 8.620 ".60
Size of fleet at yearend', 14u1 12-4 1 (oK )4
(I) Edudes cumulav effect of chap in countin pniple of 512i, millimon (S13 per.iurel
(2) Includes $2.6 mllon gains on sales of arcraft and $3.1 million from the sale of certain financial assets
(3) Includs $10.8 million pins on sales of rcraft. SS.q million from the sale of certain financial assets, and $2 3 million from the settlement o(a contingencN.
(4) Incudes $1.6 million gains on sales of aircralt and $3.6 million fom the sale of certain financial assets
(5) Includes TrnSw&r's results through June 30. 19"
(6) lnchdks $10. 1milhon net gins from dhe discontinuance of TranStar's operations and $4 i million firom tde sale of cetain financial assets
(') Includes a pin of 5 nuillion from the sale of amrcaft delisen positions
(8) Includes de accounts of TraStar since June 50. 1985
(9) Includes leased aircrafh
-"11:1
IC*18 198 1986 1985Y. 198-4 118
S 828.3-43 $ "5iA•-9 S ". S 6.689 " S 1336w
14.-3 13.#28 13.621 13.6-03 12.11 I IO.35'
!.658 13.2 1 12.882 9.3-10 c72" 4.491
800.43-1 -,8.328 "670 -9.6-2 35 i9)-.-
"_4.454 o-$9 ,82- 601.148 40-.I
85.9A) 30..3 88.833 f8.2- 6. 4l)•
o2O"1 .... 23.51" 17.0 o-49 _ 4.92"
85.360 29.0*3 65.446 bO,8-, (.S.s48 .;5" 1
2-.408 8.918 15.hll 13.506 18.12-1 22..0_ 4
s 5".952 S 20.1ii $ 50.035 $ 4".2-8 S 4(..-24 S 40.86"
S.61 5.21 Si1 $51 $5o $.40
S.0-41415 5.0-335 S.0-4335 $.0-1335 S.0-.335 S.0-335
S 1.308.389 s 1.012.640 S 1.061,9 S 1.002.403 S 6-40.2-1-1 58".258
S 369.541 S 251.130 $ 339.069 s .81.308 S 153.314 S 158701
S 5".6375 S 51+.28 $ 511.850 US 46W.04 S i6l.-68 S 314.556
5.1% 1.900 4.8% 5.6%0 8.1%° 8 100 *
10.86 4.0. 10.3% 11.400 14.+% 14 2%.
39.4% 32.80o 39.8% .45.0%o0 29.8% 33 5%o
14.8"6.582 13.503.2-42 13.63-.515 12.651239 10.09-.544 9.511.000
".6"6.2i- -.- 89.3-(, .3,.401 5.9i.-tO0 4.669.43) 3.893.821
13,309.04-4 13.331055, 12.534.484 9.884.526 7.983.093 6.32.422.4
5% 58.4%f 58.8% 60.41% 58.5% 61.6%
516 5- 5i42 4-2 436 409
2-4.859 2"0.5) 262.082 230.22- 200.12-4 1iF.421
555.68 $si5.bb s5..-3 551" 91 S48353 S,5 5-
1079' 9.6ic 10.05' 1100c 11.12' 11.13c
6.4"€ 1.814c 'lIC 6.88' 671C ".09O
5.82' 5.6lc 5.41' 6.08c 5.86c 600C
51.3-c 54 31'c 51.42' -8. I'c 82.4c4 85 92C
6.46- 5i75 5.819 5i.21 3.934 3.462
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SOUTHWEST AIRLINES FACT SHEET
JANUARY 1993
COMPANY NAME: Southwest Airlines Co.
HEADQUARTERS: 2702 Love Field Drive
P.O. Box 36611
Dallas, TX 75235
LEADERSHIP: Herbert (Herb) D. Kelleher
Chairman of the Board, President,
and Chief Exectdve Officer











Dallas (Love Field) Reno
Detroit (City & Metro) Rio Grande Valley (Harlingen)
El Paso Sacramento
Houston (Hobby & Intercontinental) San Antonio
Indianapolis San Diego
Kansas City San Francisco
Las Vegas St. Louis
Little Rock Tulsa
Southwest serves 34 cities (36 airports) in 15 states
across the United States.
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Fad Sheet/page 2
TYPE OF SERVICE: Southwest operates 142 Boeing 737 jets.
APPR OX.
TYPE NUMBER SEA RA
737-200 49 122 1200
737-300 68 137 1600
737-500 25 122 1400
Cruising speed of 564 mph
The airline was a launch customer for the Boeing 737-500 and -
300 series aircraft.
NUMBER OF Over 12,000 total active employees throughout the
EMPLOYEES: system.
STOCK Southwest's common stock is traded under the symbol
INFORMATION: "LUV" on the NYSE.
ABOUT THE The airline began service June 18, 1971 with flights to
COMPANY: Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio. Southwest has grown to
become the seventh largest U.S. airline (in terms of domestic
Customers camried) with over 1,300 flights a day. The airline
has 20 years of consistent profitability, and was the only major
carrier in 1990, 1991, and 1992 to make net and operating
profits. Southwest became a major airline in 1989 when it
exceeded the billion dollar revenue mark. Southwest is the
U.S.'s only shorthaul, low-fare, high-frequency, point-to-point
carrier.
STATISTICS: * Southwest had a net income of $91 million in 1992.
" Total passengers carried in 1992: 27.8 million.
"• Total 1992 RPMs: 13.8 billion.
"• 1992 passenger load factor: 64.5 percent.
"• Number of job applications received in 1992: 85,000.
"• Number of new employees hired in 1992: 2,674.
" Total operating revenue in 1992: $1.69 billion.
"• Number of snacks served in 1992: 46,390,116.
POINTS OF INTEREST: On an average day in 1992, Southwest Airlines:
" Received 123,775 reservations calls.
"• Served 127,096 snacks.
"• Received 232 job applications.
"• Hired seven new employees.
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Fact Shee/lpage 3
MAJOR AREAS OF SERVICE:
DAL HOU {Hob
Established 1971 1971 1982
Gate Count 14 14 16
Daily Departures 130 124 137
Nonstop Cities Served 12 13 17
Overnight Aircraft 11 13 17
Station Employees 1283 1674 1973
SOUTH1WEST AIRLINES' TOP TEN AIRPORTS:
DAILY DEPARTRES
Phoenix 137
Dallas (Love Field) 130
Houston Hobby 124
Las Vegas 84








Gallons 221.3 252.1 282.2 309.5 341.9 398.2
Total




SOUITHWEST AIRLINES' DISTINCTIONS: F
Air Transport World named Southwest Airlines its 1991 Airline of the Year. *Southwest Airlines
has demonstrated excellence over the yeats in disciplines required for safe, reliable, and fairly priced
air transportation,' reports Air Transport World's February 1992 issue.
Southwest Airlines ranked Number One in Customer Satisfaction of all major U.S. airlines (based
on 1991 data received by the U.S. Department of Transportation).
The airline has earned the coveted "Triple Crown'-for best ontime performance, the fewest
mishandled baggage reports, and the lowest number of Customer complaints--i 1 times, according
to monthly statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
The airline's average aircraft trip length in 1992 was 375 miles with an average duration of about
one hour.
In 1992, Southwest's average one-way airfare was just under $58 with an average passenger trip
length of just under 500 miles.
Southwest consistently ranks first in market share in more than 95 percent of its top 50 city-pair
markets and, in the aggregate, holds a market share exceeding 60 percent.
In its book, How to Fly, the Consumer Federation of America selected Southwest as America's best
airline value, based on its combination of low fares and excellent service quality.
The founding of Southwest is viewed by many as the 'start of the deregulation revolution." (Source:
New York Times, 1986).
Southwest was the first airline to drastically lower 'fares based on peak and off-peak hours (two tier,
systemwide fares).
Southwest was the first to introduce "discount ticket books' to frequent travelers--the "grandfather'
of the frequent flier bonus program.
"* The airline began the first profit sharing plan in the U.S. airline industry. Through this plan,
employees own about ten percent of the Company stock.
"* Southwest's fleet was an average of only 6.9 years of age at the end of 1992.
The airline was the first to announce senior citizens' discounts in 1971. Most other major airlines
followed suit.
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CONTACT: Melanie Jones
(214) 904-4413
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES SWEEPS 1992 AIRLINE PERFORMANCE RANKINGS
DALLAS--February 4, 1993--For the first time in the history of the
Department of Transportation (DOT) Air Travel Consumer Report, one carrier,
Southwest Airlines, topped all three major performance categories for the year,
capturing the industry's first annual "Triple Crown" for its 1992 performance.
"This landmark Tripla Crown exemplifies the commitment of our over
12,000 Employees to consistently provide 'Positively Outrageous Customer
Service'," said Colleen Barrett, executive vice president-Customers and corporate
secretary of Southwest Airlines. "Our Employees began 1992 with their sights set
on winning the annual Triple Crown, and we could not be more proud that their
dedication, teamwork, and winning spirit made it happen."
The "Triple Crown" consists of the best ontime performance, best baggage
handling record, and fewest Customer complaints of all carriers for which
performance is reported in all categories of the report. The Dallas-based airline's




Triple Crown title for individual months' performance 11 times, seven of them in
1992. No other carrier has ever earned the Triple Crown, even for a single month.
Southwest had 92.1 percent of its more than 1,300 daily flights arrive on
time in 1992, the best annual average of any carrier since the report began in
1987. Only 3.72 out of every 1,000 Southwest Customers reported any baggage
problems in 1992, and for every 100,000 Customers flying on Southwest during
the year. only .24 filed complaints with the DOT.
Southwest is the nation's seventh largest domestic airline in terms of
passenger enplanements. The carrier operates a fleet of 141 Boeing 737s with an






%(RJANK) RATIO (RANK) RATIO (RANK)
Alaska 84.6 (4) 6.04 (7) 0.48 (2)
America West 88.9 (2) 4.42 (2) 1.50 (9)
American 82.1 (6) 4.73 (3) 1.40 (8)
Continental 79.0(10) 6.13(10) 1.17 (7)
Delta 79.1 (9) 5.71 (6) 0.58 (3)
Northwest 86.1 (3) 5.49 (5) 0.74 (4)
Southwest 92.1 (1) 3.72 (1) 0.24 (1)
TWA 82.1 (5) 6.06 (8) 2.82 (10)
United 81.3 (7) 5.30 (4) 1.05 (6)
USAir 79.6 (8) 6.Q (9) QM (5)
AVERAGE 82.3 5.36 1.03
Source: DOT Air Travel Consumer Reports.
Note: Statistics shown for the baggage handling category are a compilation of monthly baggage handling
statistics. In consumer complaints, the DOT ranks Alaska Airlines separately from the major airlines;
however, as one of the ten carriers for which data is reported in all three categories, it is ranked above
with the others for purposes of Triple Crown evaluation.
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